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BABBLING ABOUT EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW:  DOES THE MASTER 
BUILDER UNDERSTAND THE BLUEPRINT FOR THE 
GREAT TOWER? 
William R. Corbett* 
“I will say in 25 years of advocacy before this Court I have not 
seen one area of the law that seems to me as difficult to sort out 
as this particular one is.”1 
 
3 They said to each other, “Come, let’s make bricks and bake 
them thoroughly.” They used brick instead of stone, and tar for 
mortar. 4 Then they said, “Come, let us build ourselves a city, 
with a tower that reaches to the heavens, so that we may make a 
name for ourselves and not be scattered over the face of the 
whole earth.” 
  
5 But the Lord came down to see the city and the tower that the 
men were building. 6 The Lord said, “If as one people speaking 
the same language they have begun to do this, then nothing they 
plan to do will be impossible for them. 7 Come, let us go down 
and confuse their language so they will not understand each 
other.” 
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 1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 
(2009) (No. 08-441), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-441.pdf 
(statement by Carter G. Phillips, arguing for respondent); see Martha Chamallas, Title VII’s 
Midlife Crisis:  The Case of Constructive Discharge, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 307-09 (2004) 
(stating that neither the 1964 Civil Rights Act nor the 1991 Civil Rights Act defines 
“discrimination,” that “Understanding Title VII law has never been easy,” and that “[a]fter 
more than a decade of litigation under the revised [1991] Act, . . . Title VII law has never 
been more complex and confusing”). 
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 8 So the Lord scattered them from there over all the earth, and 
they stopped building the city. 9 That is why it was called 
Babel—because there the Lord confused the language of the 
whole world.  From there the Lord scattered them over the face 
of the whole earth.2 
INTRODUCTION 
A.  Building a Great Tower 
 About forty-five years ago, Congress drew up the blueprint and laid 
the foundation of federal employment discrimination law with the 
enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3  Since that time the 
Supreme Court has taken the lead in developing the law by constructing 
legal theories, proof structures and analytical frameworks to effectuate the 
prohibition in Title VII (and other employment discrimination statutes) 
against refusing to hire, fire, or otherwise discriminate in employment 
decisions “because of . . . [the protected characteristic].”4  These theories 
and proof structures inform employers, lawyers, and judges about how 
courts at various stages of litigation will analyze employment decisions to 
determine if they were made “because of” a protected characteristic.  
Congress has revised that blueprint occasionally, sometimes adding new 
structures,5 and sometimes demolishing work that the Supreme Court had 
directed.6 
 
 2. Genesis 11:3-9 (New Int’l Version).  There are numerous versions of the great tower 
story, including several in Judaeo-Christian sources, the Qur’an and Islamic traditions, and 
Sumerian lore.  The tower story is included in the Sumerian epic of Enmerkar and the lord 
of Aratta.  THORKILD JACOBSEN, THE HARPS THAT ONCE . . .:  SUMERIAN POETRY IN 
TRANSLATION 275-319 (1987). 
 3. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 66 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000e to 2000e-15 (2006)).  Title VII was enacted in 1964, but its effective date was July 2, 
1965.  See Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 716a, 78 Stat. 241, 266 (1964) (stating that the effective 
date shall be one year after the date of enactment). 
 4. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Americans with Disabilities 
Act). 
 5. Congress passed several subsequent laws covering additional characteristics, which 
include the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 
(1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-633(a)); the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
12101-12117); and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 
122 Stat. 881 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.). 
 6. For example, Congress reacted to overturn U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the 
following statutes:  the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 
(1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)); the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
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 We can think of employment discrimination law as a construction 
project—the building of a great tower—with Congress as Architect, the 
Supreme Court as Master Builder, and the lower courts as subordinate 
builders.  From the beginning, it was an astoundingly ambitious, and 
perhaps audacious, project.  Congress envisioned a tower of law that would 
elevate people, reaching toward the heavens by attempting to eradicate 
invidious employment discrimination. 
 With the blueprint drawn and the foundation laid by the Architect, 
the Master Builder began constructing the theories and frameworks atop 
the foundation in one of its first employment discrimination decisions, 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.7  The building project has continued apace since 
Griggs.  The Court has created two major theories of discrimination—
disparate treatment8 and disparate impact9—each with its own proof 
structures.10  In Griggs the Court built a proof structure for disparate 
impact.  In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green11 and Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins12 it built two for individual disparate treatment:  pretext and mixed 
motives, respectively.  The Court also developed an analysis for systemic 
disparate treatment cases that is less rigid than the individual disparate 
treatment frameworks.13  Along the way, the Master Builder has remodeled 
some of its construction, as it did with the disparate impact proof structure 
in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.14  The Architect occasionally has 
 
166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); the ADA Amendments Act 
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 2, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
12101); and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (Jan. 
29, 2009). 
 7. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 8. Disparate treatment is a form of intentional discrimination.  See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (noting that disparate treatment 
was “the most obvious evil” providing impetus for the enactment of Title VII). 
 9. Disparate impact is a theory of unintentional discrimination in which liability is 
based on use of a facially neutral practice or criterion that produces a statistically significant 
disparate impact on a protected group, where such practice cannot be justified by business 
necessity.  See, e.g., id. (explaining that disparate impact liability under Title VII does not 
require proof of a discriminatory motive). 
 10. “Proof structure” refers to what must be proven, in what order, and on whom the 
burden rests at each stage.  In announcing the McDonnell Douglas or “pretext” proof 
structure, the Supreme Court responded to an ongoing concern:  “The case before us raises 
significant questions as to the proper order and nature of proof in actions under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793-94 
(1973). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 13. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 336 (1977) (holding that 
the systemic disparate treatment  proof structure requires the plaintiff to present evidence 
establishing that intentional discrimination is the employer’s standard operating procedure). 
 14. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (placing the burden of 
persuasion on the plaintiff to disprove business necessity and defining business necessity as 
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stepped back in and done some renovation when it did not like the Master 
Builder’s construction,15 but it has left most of the details of construction to 
the Master Builder.  Courts, lawyers, and others have spoken essentially a 
single language of employment discrimination law as they have applied 
most of the same theories, frameworks, and principles to all of the laws.16  
The minor variations in the law applicable to the different employment 
discrimination statutes might be likened to different dialects.17  The 
common language has facilitated the building project.18  With a common 
language, the subordinate builders built a tower that was largely 
symmetrical regardless of which part came into view—Title VII, the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), or the Americans With 
 
requiring only that the practice significantly serve a legitimate goal of the employer). 
 15. See supra note 6 (discussing Congressional action in several federal anti-
discrimination statutes designed to overturn Supreme Court decisions). 
 16. See, e.g., Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Role of Second-Order Uniformity in Disparate 
Treatment Law: McDonnell Douglas’s Longevity and the Mixed-Motives Mess, 45 AM. BUS. 
L. J. 511, 542 (2008) (“when statutes share the same or similar language . . . courts generally 
interpret that language consistently.  An interpretation of one of the statutes’ language is 
usually treated as binding on the other statutes’ identical language.”); see also Martin J. 
Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 857 (2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1515765 (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s abandonment in Gross of its prior efforts to adopt a unified approach to disparate 
treatment law); Rhonda M. Reaves, One of These Things Is Not Like the Other: Analogizing 
Ageism to Racism in Employment Discrimination Cases, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 839, 846 
(2004) (warning that “[a]nti-discrimination principles are often mechanically applied 
without sufficient exploration of difference”); David J. Willbrand, Comment, Better Late 
Than Never?  The Function of After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination 
Litigation, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 617, 692 (1996) (“This occurrence should not be surprising, 
for courts, in a sort of jurisprudential cross-pollination, have traditionally borrowed and 
applied employment discrimination principles across statutory bounds.”). 
 17. Some variations are required by the blueprints drawn by Congress, and others have 
been fashioned by the Court.  For example, statutory differences include the following:  1) 
The bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) applies to sex, religion, and national 
origin under Title VII, and age under the ADEA, but not to race and color.  42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(e) (Title VII BFOQ) and 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (ADEA BFOQ); 2) In the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Congress added a statutory disparate impact analysis, 42 U.S.C. 
§2000e-2(k), and a statutory mixed-motives analysis to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m) 
& 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), but not to the ADEA; 3) The ADEA’s defense of “reasonable factors 
other than age,” has no counterpart in Title VII.  29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1); and 4) The duty to 
make a reasonable accommodation applies to only religion under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(j), and disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§12112(b)(5)(A). 
 18. For example, the courts have developed facility with the pretext and mixed-motives 
structures because they have applied them across the employment discrimination statutes.  
Indeed, they have even applied them to other types of employment claims.  See, e.g., 
Richardson v. Monitronics Int’l, Inc., 434 F.3d 327, 332-33 (5th Cir. 2005) (applying Desert 
Palace mixed-motives analysis to FMLA retaliation claim).  Moreover, there is a large and 
rich body of case law on which courts can rely when applying these analyses, made larger 
by such cross-pollination. 
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Disabilities Act (ADA).19  Despite minor variations, symmetry seemed to 
be a salient characteristic of the blueprint.  In 1991, the Architect expressed 
displeasure with some of the recent work on the tower.  By enacting the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 (or “the 1991 Act”),20 Congress effectively 
demolished some of the structure and also modified the original blueprint.  
It is the Architect’s 1991 plan—and its subsequent interpretation by the 
Master Builder—that has brought us to our current state of confusion. 
  In 2003, the Court began its work of interpreting the 1991 
modifications of the blueprint by adding a strange-looking structure to the 
building—Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa.21  Although this new structure 
deviated substantially from the work that preceded it, the Court said the 
new blueprint required it.  This new and different structure lacked sharp, 
definitional lines.  It was hard for the subordinate builders—the lower 
courts—to understand Desert Palace and to know how to build on it.  In 
2009, the Supreme Court added another structure, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 
Inc.,22 this time to the ADEA side of the tower, based on its interpretation 
of the 1991 drawings and a surprising new interpretation of the original 
blueprint. 
 When viewed alongside Desert Palace, Gross reveals several things 
about the current and future work on the tower.  First, the Master Builder 
believes that the plans handed down by the Architect in 1991 require 
structures different from what the subordinate builders had constructed 
before.23  More surprisingly, the 1991 plan has prompted the Master 
Builder to reinterpret the original blueprint and demolish existing 
 
 19. This Article focuses on the law under Title VII and the ADEA.  Many of the 
principles developed under Title VII, including the proof structures, also have been applied 
to the ADA.  See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003) (applying the 
McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis to an ADA case).  The Seventh Circuit recently held 
that under the reasoning of Gross, the mixed-motives proof structure does not apply to ADA 
claims.  Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2010).  This is a 
curious result in light of the enactment of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, which 
overturned two prior Supreme Court decisions in order to broaden coverage under the ADA:  
not long after Congress passed legislation to overturn Supreme Court decisions that 
narrowly interpreted coverage under the ADA, the Seventh Circuit applies Gross to the 
ADA to deny plaintiffs use of the mixed-motives framework in asserting their ADA claims. 
 20. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).  The 1991 
Act was enacted after President Bush’s veto of the similar Civil Rights Act of 1990.  See 
136 CONG. REC. S16, 418-19 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (recording President Bush’s veto of 
the 1990 act).  A principal objective of the 1991 Act was to overturn several Supreme Court 
decisions.  See H.R. REP. NO. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 2-4 (1991), reprinted in 
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 694-96 (noting the 1991 Act’s intent to overrule several Supreme 
Court cases, including Wards Cove v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1988)). 
 21. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
 22. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009). 
 23. In both Desert Palace and Gross, the Court interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
as changing the case law under Title VII and the ADEA, respectively. 
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structures, telling the builders that they misunderstood the original 
blueprint.24  Second, the Master Builder now reads the blueprint, by 
interpreting the new 1991 drawings and reinterpreting the original 
blueprint, as requiring a shift to asymmetrical building—the use of 
different structures, depending upon the part of the tower.  Now the 
Supreme Court is requiring courts and lawyers to speak slightly different 
languages depending on which part of the tower they are working—Title 
VII or the ADEA.  This change in plans would be confounding enough on 
its own, but the subordinate builders are further confused by the Master 
Builder’s refusal to give detailed instructions about its new interpretation of 
the blueprint.  The Court in Desert Palace made general statements about 
the construction to be completed, but declined to give detailed instructions.  
The Court was more concrete in its pronouncement in Gross, declaring the 
mixed–motives proof structure inapplicable to age discrimination claims, 
but still not clear enough.25  Third, not only is the Court requiring different 
structures for the ADEA and Title VII, but Gross is also the latest in a 
series of cases instructing that the ADEA portion of the tower is to be far 
less prominent than its Title VII counterpart.26 
 At this point, as the subordinate builders try to build on Desert 
Palace and Gross, their language has been differentiated, and they are 
confounded about what and how to build on the recent structures.27  
 
 24. In Gross the Court looked to the language of the ADEA and said that the meaning 
of “because of . . . age” has been misinterpreted by the lower courts.  Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 
2345; see infra Part I.B (discussing the impacts of Gross and arguing for greater symmetry 
in the disparate treatment proof structures of Title VII and the ADEA). 
 25. For example, does the pretext analysis apply to ADEA claims?  See infra note 27.  
Moreover, does the holding of Gross extend to claims under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, requiring plaintiffs to prove but-for causation?  See supra note 19. 
 26. See infra Part II.E (discussing the adverse impacts of this asymmetrical approach on 
the pension benefit system). 
 27. Consider, for example, the lower courts’ uncertainty about whether the McDonnell 
Douglas pretext analysis still applies to ADEA cases after Gross.  See Moore v. Dirt 
Motorsports, Inc., 2009 WL 2997077 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 15, 2009) (surveying the decisions 
to date on the issue and concluding that, after Gross, a majority of courts that have 
considered the issue have continued to apply the pretext analysis to ADEA cases at the 
summary judgment stage); compare Geiger v. Tower Automotive, 579 F.3d 614, 623 (2009) 
(noting that the Supreme Court in Gross expressly declined to address the applicability of 
the pretext analysis to the ADEA and continuing to recognize its applicability in the Sixth 
Circuit), and Smith v. Allentown, 2009 WL 4912120 (3d Cir. Dec. 22, 2009) (holding that 
Gross is not in conflict with continued application of the McDonnell Douglas proof 
structure in ADEA cases) with Holowecki v. Federal Express Corp., 644 F. Supp. 2d 338, 
352 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (recognizing that the Supreme Court left open whether Gross 
implicitly eliminated the pretext analysis from ADEA cases and not resolving the issue).  
Another issue for which Gross may have implications is the applicability of the mixed-
motives analysis to claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).  The Seventh 
Circuit, relying on Gross, held that the mixed-motives analysis does not apply under the 
ADA.  See Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 961 (7th Cir. 2010) 
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Furthermore, it is not clear that the asymmetry resulting from the perceived 
new blueprint will yield a sound structure.  The Master Builder’s 
interpretation of the new blueprint will produce a scaled-down version on 
the ADEA portion of the tower.  While the subordinate builders obviously 
will do their best to build on the structures created by the Master Builder, it 
is fair to ask whether this is the tower intended by the Architect.  Most of 
the uncertainty and confusion stem from the blueprint modifications of 
1991.  Maybe the Architect intended only minor changes in the building 
rather than a significant reinterpretation of the blueprint.  It is highly 
questionable whether the Master Builder is correctly interpreting the 1991 
plan and the original blueprint as modified. 
B.  Interpreting the Blueprint 
1. The Shift Toward Complexity, Uncertainty, and Asymmetry 
 What characteristics did Congress intend for the great tower of 
employment discrimination law?  Perhaps it should be simple to the extent 
that such a project can be simple, with sharp, well-defined lines so that 
employees and employers can understand their rights and obligations, and 
lawyers and judges can apply them accurately and expeditiously.  Some 
measure of complexity28 and uncertainty,29 however, is necessary and 
 
(“Although the Gross decision construed the ADEA, the importance that the court attached 
to the express incorporation of the mixed-motive framework into Title VII suggests that 
when another anti-discrimination statute lacks comparable language, a mixed-motive claim 
will not be viable under that statute.”).  Yet another post—Gross issue is whether the mixed-
motives analysis applies to non-ADEA retaliation claims.  The Fifth Circuit held that the 
mixed-motives analysis remains applicable to Title VII retaliation claims because Gross 
involved an ADEA claim, and extending its rationale to Title VII retaliation claims “would 
be contrary to Gross’s admonition against intermingling interpretations of the two statutory 
schemes.”  Smith v. Xerox Corp., No. 08-11115,  __ F.3d __, 2010 WL 1052837, at *6 (5th 
Cir. Mar. 24, 2010).   
 28. Simplicity can be a good characteristic of laws, but in some cases simplicity may be 
achieved at the expense of fairness, effectiveness, or other characteristics that are also 
desirable.  Compare RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995) 
(favoring simple legal rules if rules cannot be avoided) with Louis Kaplow, A Model of the 
Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 150, 161 (1995): 
Complexity often is discussed as an evil to be minimized, as in commentary on 
the income tax.  Of course, less complexity is to be preferred if the same 
substantive rules can be applied.  But much complexity—the type examined in 
this article—arises because of the benefits from rules that are more precisely 
tailored to particular behavior.  To talk of minimizing complexity in this context 
is misguided:  the simplest rules might permit all acts, require equal reductions 
of all pollutants regardless of their toxicity, or require the same speed limit on 
all roads. 
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possibly even beneficial.  A high degree of symmetry among the various 
laws and covered characteristics may also be desirable, as this could 
improve simplicity and certainty.  Complete uniformity, however, is not 
appropriate because discrimination based on the various protected 
characteristics is not a monolithic phenomenon,30 and the goals of and 
rationales for the laws differ.31  If simplicity, certainty, and symmetry are 
characteristics generally intended by Congress, recent Supreme Court 
interpretations of the laws reveal a structure that is becoming more 
complex, less certain on some crucial questions, and less symmetrical 
across the laws.  The Court says this is the structure as drawn by Congress 
in the original blueprint and the 1991 modification. 
 Ultimately, I contend that the destruction of symmetry in the 
disparate treatment proof structures applicable to Title VII and the ADEA 
is the most harmful result of Gross.  Complete symmetry cannot be 
achieved because of differences in statutory language, and even where it 
can be achieved based on statutory language, differences in the types of 
discrimination may support some asymmetry in the law.  Yet, I think 
symmetry in employment discrimination law is a characteristic to be 
desired when the statutes permit it and there is not a distinction in the types 
of discrimination that justifies asymmetry.  I am not alone in believing that 
 
Kaplow, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. at 161. 
 29. Certainty would be considered by most to be a positive characteristic of law, so that 
parties can know the law and manage their conduct accordingly.  Moreover, certainty 
facilitates the assessment of claims by employers and employees, lawyers, and judges.  
Generally, it is believed that uncertainty both raises the costs and decreases the efficiency of 
the law.  E.g., Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment (Really), 59 HASTINGS L.J. 643, 
652 (2008) [hereinafter Katz, Unifying].  There are circumstances, however, in which 
uncertainty may achieve socially beneficial results.  For example, uncertainty may cause 
actors to avoid brinksmanship regarding violating the law and instead become proactive in 
developing strategies to avoid liability.  Cf. Frank Dobbin, Do the Social Sciences Shape 
Corporate Anti-Discrimination Practice?  The United States and France, 23 COMP. LAB. L. 
& POL’Y  J. 829, 833 (2002): 
[E]mployers were uncertain of what the law meant and of where it was going.  
To inoculate themselves against employment discrimination suits, which could 
prove costly and embarrassing, they engaged experts who followed social-
scientific understandings of discrimination and who institutionalized equal 
opportunity practices in anticipation of where the courts would go. 
Dobbin, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. at 833. 
 30. See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1993) (explaining that 
age discrimination typically involves negative stereotyping of older workers rather than 
animus against them); see also Reaves, supra note 16 (explaining why it is inappropriate to 
import all Title VII race discrimination law into the ADEA). 
 31. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Hands-Tying and the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1813, 1813 (1996) (discussing different justification for the ADEA); 
Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances:  The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 37 (2000) (positing that employment discrimination law has sought to 
achieve a more far-reaching societal transformation regarding race than sex). 
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symmetry is a valuable characteristic of employment discrimination law.  
The Supreme Court in decisions before Gross generally supported 
symmetry between Title VII and the ADEA, and specifically in disparate 
treatment analysis.32  Congress, too, seems to insist on a high degree of 
symmetry, as indicated in the bills that have been introduced to overturn 
Gross—The Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act33—but 
why? 
 One reason for valuing symmetry is that it enhances simplicity and 
understanding.  The law is simpler if employers and employees, litigants, 
lawyers, and jurors can apply common principles under the different 
discrimination laws.  Professor Katz has argued that “fragmentation” of 
disparate treatment law results in doctrinal confusion that is expensive and 
inefficient.34  The difficulty of analyzing cases should be of even greater 
concern with the availability of jury trials in most disparate treatment 
cases.35 
A second reason to favor symmetry among employment 
discrimination laws is that the laws should be perceived by the public to be 
sensible and fair.  The public at large, and even lawyers and judges, are 
more likely to perceive symmetrical employment discrimination laws to be 
fair and worthy of support.  They are more likely to be cynical about 
asymmetrical laws and to question their fairness.  This sense of fairness 
about symmetrical discrimination laws runs deeper than the canon of 
statutory construction that courts should interpret statutes with similar 
language similarly.  Discrimination laws that discriminate are vexatious; it 
is the very fact that Title VII and the ADEA are statutes that ban 
discrimination that troubles people when they see distinctions being drawn 
between or among the protected characteristics.  Many people 
 
 32. See, e.g., Katz, Gross Disunity, supra note 16, at 857 (“The Supreme Court has 
done a turn-about on the value of uniformity in employment discrimination law.”); see 
Prenkert, supra note 16, at 542-43 (discussing the “consistency presumption”); see also 
Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate Treatment 
Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REV. 563, 622-23 (1996) [hereinafter Zimmer, The 
Emerging Uniform Structure] (positing the 1991 Act and two subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions began the development of a uniform structure for disparate treatment 
discrimination to eliminate much of the previous complexity and confusion). 
 33. S. 1756, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3721, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 34. See Katz, Unifying, supra note 29, at 643-44 (proposing a single framework to 
overcome both doctrinal confusion and existing inferior frameworks); see also Katz, Gross 
Disunity, supra note 16, at 857 passim (critiquing the Supreme Court’s rejection of uniform 
requirements of proof in disparate treatment cases). 
 35. Jury trials were not generally available in disparate treatment cases, other than age 
cases, until passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.  In 1996, Professor Zimmer noted the 
importance of what then appeared to be an emerging uniform proof structure for disparate 
treatment cases:  “The clarity and simplicity of this emerging uniform structure has become 
more important as we enter an era in which the right to trial by jury exists in all such cases.”  
Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure, supra note 32, at 625. 
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underestimate the complexity of employment discrimination law.  What 
they do understand about it is the formal equality rationale underpinning 
employment discrimination law—that distinctions should not be made 
among people who are similarly situated.  When the law is not 
symmetrical, people wonder why anti-discrimination law discriminates.  
Borrowing from George Orwell, people wonder why all people covered by 
employment discrimination laws are equal, but some are more equal than 
others.36  In the context of Gross, the dissatisfaction takes the form of a 
question:  “Why are people claiming discrimination based on race, color, 
sex, religion, or national origin granted more protection than people 
claiming age discrimination?” 
2. The Incredible Shrinking Age Discrimination Act 
 With a national demographic of a large and increasing percentage of 
older people37 and a large percentage of the workforce composed of older 
workers,38 the ADEA has become an increasingly significant law.  One 
measure of its growing significance is the increase in the volume of claims 
filed and ensuing litigation.39  Several recent Supreme Court decisions have 
 
 36. See GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 88 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1993) (1946) 
(containing the memorable and oft-quoted line:  “All animals are equal, but some are more 
equal than others”).  Consider, for example, the Sixth Circuit’s holding, subsequently 
reversed by the Supreme Court, that younger people are protected from age discrimination 
in favor of older people: 
[W]e do not share the commonly held belief that this situation is one of so-
called “reverse discrimination.”  Insofar as we are able to determine, the 
expression “reverse discrimination” has no ascertainable meaning in the law.  
An action is either discriminatory or it is not discriminatory, and some 
discriminatory actions are prohibited by the law. . . . [T]he protected class 
should be protected; to hold otherwise is discrimination, plain and simple. 
Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 471 (6th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 540 U.S. 
581 (2004).  Reverse discrimination is an area in which courts sometimes rail against 
asymmetry.  See, e.g., Lind v. Battle Creek, 681 N.W.2d 334 (Mich. 2004) (rejecting 
distinctions in the analysis of reverse race discrimination claims). 
 37. See generally LAURA B. SHRESTHA, THE CHANGING DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF THE 
UNITED STATES (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress Order Code RL32701, 
updated May 5, 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32701.pdf 
(highlighting some of the demographic changes that have occurred since 1950 and 
illustrating how these and future trends will reshape the U.S. in the decades to come). 
 38. See generally Bureau of Labor Statistics, Older Workers:  Are There More Older 
People in the Workplace, http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2008/older workers/ (presenting 
various charts and graphs showing the growing number of older workers); Dennison Keller, 
Note, Older, Wiser and More Dispensable: ADEA Options Available Under Smith v. City of 
Jackson:  Desperate Times Call for Disparate Impact, 33 NORTHERN KY. L. REV. 259, 279 
(2006). 
 39. A good measure of the volume of disputes is the data generated by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on discrimination charges filed with the 
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interpreted the ADEA as being a less prominent part of the tower.  It is not 
clear that this is consistent with Congress’s plan. 
3.  The Need for Clarification by the Architect 
 I have argued that the uncertainty and complexity introduced into 
employment discrimination law by the Master Builder in Desert Palace, 
Inc. v. Costa40 six years ago should have been vexing enough to the 
Architect to prompt Congress to work on the blueprint.41  The Court’s 
recent decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Servs., Inc.42 has made the need 
for intervention far more urgent.  Gross interpreted the ADEA in light of 
the 1991 Act as requiring a high degree of asymmetry between the ADEA 
and Title VII.  Gross also was the latest of several Supreme Court decisions 
interpreting the ADEA in a way that substantially reduces the protections 
of the ADEA below those of Title VII.43  Gross should make it abundantly 
clear to Congress that it must draft a clear blueprint addressing the issues 
rather than simply tearing down particular Supreme Court decisions.44  
Although there are issues on which Congress may achieve an appropriate 
result by merely overturning a particular Supreme Court decision,45 the 
issues in Desert Palace and Gross involved the fundamental building 
blocks that Congress and the Court have developed over the decades, 
requiring a more comprehensive repair.  If the Builder is reading the plans 
incorrectly, it is incumbent on the Architect to issue new plans which detail 
 
agency.  See http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (indicating the 
number of individual charges filed each year between 1997 and 2009).  For 2008, the EEOC 
reported a 28% increase in age discrimination charges filed over the number filed in 2007, 
which was the largest increase among all types of charges.  See 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/adea.cfm (showing the number of charges 
filed and resolved under the ADEA between 1997 and 2009); EEOC Charges Reached 
Record High, Commission Confirms in Fiscal 2008 Report, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 46, 
at A-12 (Mar. 12, 2009).  The agency’s 12-year chart shows a general upward trend and a 
significant increase from 1997.  See Reaves, supra note 16, at 843 & n.7 (“[O]lder workers 
are the fastest growing group of discrimination plaintiffs.”). 
 40. 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
 41. William R. Corbett, Fixing Employment Discrimination Law, 62 SMU L. REV. 81 
(2009) [hereinafter Corbett, Fixing]. 
 42. 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009). 
 43. For discussion of the other cases, see infra Part II. 
 44. The bills introduced in Congress to overturn Gross, the Protecting Older Workers 
Against Discrimination Act, supra note 33, adopt the approach of tearing down a particular 
decision.  For discussion of the bills, see infra Part III.D.  A more comprehensive approach 
is needed. 
 45. For example, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 overturned the Court’s 
decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), limiting the 
time period for filing a charge based on discriminatory pay practices.  Pub. L. No. 111-2, 
123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.). 
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how the work is to proceed.  Even if the Master Builder is interpreting the 
blueprint correctly, it is not giving clear and detailed instructions to its 
builders, and the Architect should provide clarity.  In doing so, the 
Architect should learn from the experience in 1991 and issue a detailed 
plan for the work that does not leave as many matters for the Master 
Builder to interpret, as it did in the 1991 Act.46 
 Part I of this article examines the Court’s decisions in Desert 
Palace, Inc. v. Costa and Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.  The 
section compares and contrasts those decisions—the two Supreme Court 
cases interpreting the blueprint regarding disparate treatment after the 1991 
Act.  The section explains how, taken together, Desert Palace and Gross 
have made employment discrimination law more complex, less certain, and 
less symmetrical.  The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Rachid v. Jack in the Box, 
Inc.47 is discussed as an interpretation that the Supreme Court could have 
adopted in Gross to maintain uniformity of proof structures between Title 
VII and the ADEA.  Part II discusses Gross as the latest of several Court 
decisions constricting the ADEA.  Part III proposes that Congress, as 
Architect, should step in and clarify the blueprint in a way that at least 
addresses the issue of the appropriate proof structures under Title VII and 
the ADEA.  If Congress wants more simplicity, certainty, and symmetry, it 
will need to make several changes. 
 It is not clear from the various renditions of the old story whether 
the Tower of Babel collapsed or the people, confounded by their different 
languages, simply gave up on the project and dispersed to pursue other 
endeavors.  Regardless, the great tower of employment discrimination law 
should have a better fate.  I think that fate rests in the hands of the 
Architect. 
I. THE MASTER BUILDER REINTERPRETS THE BLUEPRINT 
A. The First Interpretation of the 1991 Blueprint Modifications:  Desert 
Palace, Inc. v. Costa 
 In Desert Palace,48 the plaintiff sued her employer claiming that she 
 
 46. Professor Katz criticizes the Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act 
as leaving too much to the courts’ interpretation.  Katz, Gross Disunity, supra note 16, at 
889; see also Michael C. Harper, The Causation Standard in Federal Employment Law:  
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., and the Unfulfilled Promise of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 69 (2010) (urging more informed and comprehensive reform of the 
causation standard in federal employment discrimination and employment laws).      
 47. 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 48. I cover Desert Palace briefly and Gross more fully because Desert Palace has been 
discussed and critiqued extensively.  See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of 
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was treated differently than male employees and eventually was 
terminated—in a case of disparate discipline—because of her sex.  The 
plaintiff won a jury verdict in the trial court.  On appeal, the defendant 
employer argued that the district court erroneously gave a mixed-motives 
jury instruction.  The defendant argued that the jury instruction was 
unsupported because the plaintiff did not present direct evidence of 
discrimination.  The Ninth Circuit, in an en banc decision, rejected the 
prerequisite of direct evidence to invoke the mixed-motives analysis.49  The 
direct evidence requirement was based on Justice O’Connor’s concurring 
opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,50 and the court, looking to the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not find any such requirement in the codified 
version of the mixed-motives analysis.  The Ninth Circuit went on to 
explain the continuing viability of the McDonnell Douglas pretext 
framework as a tool to analyze claims on motions for summary judgment 
but declared it to be irrelevant to jury instructions.51  In a very short 
opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed unanimously, relying on the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 as abrogating the direct evidence requirement 
emanating from Price Waterhouse.52  The Court held that, “[i]n order to 
obtain an instruction under § 2000e-2(m), a plaintiff need only present 
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a 
motivating factor for any employment practice.’”53  About the continuing 
viability of the pretext analysis, the Court said indirectly that it would not 
resolve that issue:  “This case does not require us to decide when, if ever, § 
107 applies outside of the mixed-motive context.”54 
 With Desert Palace, the Court interpreted the new blueprint as 
eradicating the line, derived from Price Waterhouse (O’Connor, J., 
 
Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 
102-03 (2004) (critiquing Desert Palace); William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and 
the Desert Palace, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1549 (2005) [hereinafter Corbett, Allegory] (same); 
William R. Corbett, McDonnell Douglas, 1973-2003:  May You Rest in Peace?  6 U. PA. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 199 (2003) (same); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi Est Mort; Vie le Roi!”  
An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell-Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title 
VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a “Mixed Motives” Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 
71, 72 (2003) (same); Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law:  Price Waterhouse 
is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1892-1909 (2004) [hereinafter 
Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law] (same).. 
 49. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 
(2003). 
 50. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 51. Costa, 299 F.3d at 854. 
 52. 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
 53. Id. at 101 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). 
 54. Id. at 94 n.1.  Although the Court said nothing about pretext expressly, it said it 
would not resolve the range of cases covered by mixed motives.  The point is that there may 
be no cases left to which the pretext framework applies. 
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concurring), that determined whether cases were analyzed under the pretext 
or mixed-motives proof structure.  The Court declined to say, however, 
whether the McDonnell Douglas proof structure remained viable, and, if so, 
what was the new dividing line. 
B.  More Than Desert Palace II:  Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. 
 In Gross, the plaintiff had worked for the defendant employer for 
thirty-two years.  In 2003, when the plaintiff was 54 years old, he was 
working as claims administration director until he was reassigned to the 
position of claims project coordinator.  Although he retained the same 
compensation, many of his former position’s job responsibilities were 
shifted to a newly created position of Claims Administration Manager.  A 
woman in her early forties, whom plaintiff previously had supervised, was 
given the new position.  The plaintiff considered his job reassignment to be 
a demotion, and he sued for age discrimination. 
 The case was tried in federal district court.  At the close of trial, the 
court gave jury instructions to which the defendant objected: 
Gross had the burden to prove that (1) FBL demoted Gross to 
Claims Project Coordinator on January 1, 2003, and (2) that 
Gross's age was “a motivating factor” in FBL's decision to 
demote Gross. Final Jury Instruction No. 11. The instruction 
continued that the jury's verdict must be for FBL, however, “if it 
has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence that 
defendant would have demoted plaintiff regardless of his age.”55 
 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and awarded 
$46,945. 
 On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the employer challenged the jury 
instructions, arguing that the trial court erred in giving a mixed-motives 
jury instruction based on Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins because it was 
undisputed that direct evidence of age discrimination was not presented.  
The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in giving the mixed-
motives jury instructions because, under Price Waterhouse, direct evidence 
is required for such a jury instruction.  The plaintiff conceded that he did 
not present direct evidence.  The court rejected the argument that the jury 
instruction was correct because the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Desert Palace superseded Price Waterhouse.  
The court explained that, although the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended 
Title VII to provide a statutory version of the mixed-motives analysis,56 
 
 55. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 356, 360 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m) & 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
CORBETTFINAL 6/10/2010  10:51:58 AM 
2010] BABBLING ABOUT EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 697 
 
Congress did not amend the ADEA similarly.  The court explained that the 
Supreme Court, in Desert Palace, interpreted the language of section 
2000e-2(m)—added to Title VII by the Civil Rights Act of 1991—as 
making Price Waterhouse inapplicable to Title VII cases because the 
section does not refer to a prerequisite of direct evidence for applying the 
“motivating factor” standard regarding causation.  Thus, the Eighth Circuit 
held that Price Waterhouse remains controlling for ADEA cases.  
Therefore, in the absence of direct evidence, the trial court incorrectly gave 
a jury instruction that shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendant. 
 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the following question:  
Must a plaintiff present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain 
a mixed-motive instruction in a non-Title VII discrimination case?57  The 
Court majority, in a 5-4 decision, acknowledged the foregoing question as 
the one on which certiorari was granted, but then stated that it first must 
decide whether the burden of persuasion ever shifts to the defendant in an 
ADEA case.58  The majority rejected the plaintiff’s reliance on decisions 
interpreting Title VII as controlling.  The Court explained that it never had 
held that the mixed-motives analysis of Price Waterhouse applies to the 
ADEA.59  When it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress amended 
Title VII to add the mixed-motives analysis, but it did not amend the 
ADEA similarly.60  Thus, with the 1991 Act, Congress created a 
“materially different” burden of persuasion in Title VII than exists in the 
ADEA:  “motivating factor” in Title VII and “because of” in the ADEA.61  
The Court therefore concluded that its interpretation of the ADEA is not 
controlled by decisions interpreting Title VII—specifically Price 
Waterhouse and Desert Palace.  Although it was not unexpected for the 
Court to hold that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 rendered Desert Palace 
inapplicable to ADEA claims (as this was the focal issue in the many 
briefs), it was surprising that it held Price Waterhouse inapposite.62  Lower 
courts uniformly had assumed the applicability of the Price Waterhouse 
mixed-motives analysis to ADEA claims,63 and there was nothing in the 
 
 57. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 2008 WL 4462099 
(U.S. 2008) (No. 08-411). 
 58. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2348. 
 59. Id. at 2349. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 2348-49 (“Unlike Title VII the ADEA’s text does not provide that a plaintiff 
may establish discrimination by showing that age was simply a motivating factor.”). 
 62. See Katz, Gross Disunity, supra note 16, at 866 (noting that the courts below and 
the parties had assumed that the Price Waterhouse mixed-motives proof structure applied to 
ADEA claims). 
 63. See, e.g., Katz, Gross Disunity, supra note 16, at 874 (“[M]ost of [the lower] courts 
still applied Price Waterhouse in non-1991 Act cases.”); see also Harper, supra note 46, at 
100 (describing how lower courts preserved the Price Waterhouse framework in ADEA 
cases); Prenkert, supra note 16, at 547 (same). 
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1991 Act that seemed to upset that state of the law.  The Court rationalized 
the inapplicability of Price Waterhouse on the basis of the following:  1) in 
the 1991 Act Congress amended Title VII, adding a statutory mixed-
motives analysis, but it did not amend the ADEA similarly; and 2) the 
Court itself never had extended the Price Waterhouse analysis to the 
ADEA, notwithstanding the unanimity of lower courts in so applying it. 
 Having dispatched with the authority of Price Waterhouse and 
Desert Palace, the Court majority shifted to interpreting the text of the 
ADEA.  The Court read the “because of . . . age” language to mean that age 
is the but-for cause of the employer’s action.64  The Court explained this 
interpretation of “because of” based on dictionary definitions, its opinion in 
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,65 a couple of non-employment-discrimination 
Court decisions interpreting the similar language “by reason of” and “based 
on,” and a torts treatise explaining but-for causation.66  From these sources, 
the Court gleaned that the “ordinary” meaning of the statutory language 
“because of” is but-for causation.67 
After concluding that the standard of causation is but-for, the Court 
turned to the burden of persuasion.  The Court stated that the default rule is 
that plaintiffs bear the burden of persuasion, and the text of the ADEA 
indicates no exception to that default rule.68  Locking in a uniform analysis 
for intentional age discrimination cases, the Court stated that the burden of 
persuasion is the same in mixed-motives cases as in other disparate 
treatment cases:  the plaintiff must prove that age is the but-for cause of the 
employer’s decision.69 
 Having decided the case, the Court added comments about its strict 
textual approach and its distaste for the Price Waterhouse analysis.  After 
repeating that it does not consider Price Waterhouse controlling, the 
majority stated that “it is far from clear that the Court would have the same 
approach were it to consider the question today in the same instance.”70  
The Court proceeded to criticize the Price Waterhouse framework as 
difficult to apply and stated that, even if the analysis were doctrinally 
sound, “the problems associated with its application have eliminated any 
perceivable benefit to extending its framework to the ADEA.”71  The Court 
concluded by stating its holding clearly:  “a plaintiff bringing a disparate-
treatment claim pursuant to the ADEA must prove, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged adverse 
 
 64. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351. 
 65. 507 U.S. 604 (1993). 
 66. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2350. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 2351. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 2351-52. 
 71. Id. at 2352. 
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employment action.”72 
 There were two dissents.  The dissent authored by Justice Stevens 
had two major points of contention with the majority—one procedural and 
one substantive.  First, Justice Stevens criticized the majority for not 
following “prudential Court practices”73 by answering a question on which 
certiorari was not granted and which was raised in the respondent’s brief.74  
Second, he disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of “because of . . . 
age” as meaning but-for causation. 
On substantive grounds, Justice Stevens considered Price Waterhouse 
as controlling on the issue of interpretation of the “because of language” as 
meaning “motivating factor” or “substantial factor” rather than but-for 
causation.75  Although Price Waterhouse interpreted the “because of” 
language under Title VII, the language under the two statutes before the 
1991 Act was identical.  The Court long had applied interpretations of Title 
VII to the ADEA.  Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority that Hazen 
Paper Co. and Sanderson Plumbing Products v. Reeves76 support a but-for 
causation standard for the ADEA.  Rather, Justice Stevens read those cases 
as support for ADEA standards generally conforming to Title VII 
standards.  Whereas the majority interpreted Congress’s failure to amend 
the ADEA to include a mixed-motives analysis when it enacted the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 as rejecting mixed-motives under the ADEA, the 
dissent interpreted this as a ratification of the continuing applicability of the 
Price Waterhouse analysis to the ADEA.77 
Justice Stevens’ dissent drew support from the Court’s 2005 decision 
in Smith v. City of Jackson.78  In Smith, the Court held that because 
Congress did not codify a disparate impact proof structure in the ADEA, in 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, as it did in Title VII, the existing Wards Cove 
[Packing Co. v. Atonio]79 version continued to apply to the ADEA.  
Finally, Justice Stevens countered the majority’s point that the Price 
Waterhouse proof structure is too complicated and thus more trouble than it 
 
 72. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352. 
 73. Id. at 2353 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 74. Id. 
 75. The dissent said that “motivating factor” and “substantial factor” are 
interchangeable standards.  Id. at 2354 n.3.  This is not so clear.  Justice O’Connor, 
concurring in Price Waterhouse, stressed that a higher standard of causation than 
“motivating factor” should be required in order to shift the burden of persuasion to the 
employer, and she advocated “substantial factor.” Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228, 278 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 76. 530 U.S. 133 (2000). 
 77. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2356.  The dissent noted, however, that there was some 
evidence in committee reports that Congress intended for the new mixed-motives analysis to 
apply to the ADEA as well.  Id. at n.6. 
 78. 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
 79. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
CORBETTFINAL 6/10/2010  10:51:58 AM 
700 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:3 
 
is worth by pointing out that Congress codified a modified version of it in 
Title VII.80  Moreover, Justice Stevens argued that the majority’s solicitude 
for the inscrutability of the mixed-motives analysis for trial courts and 
juries was belied by the fact that the majority introduced more complexity 
into cases in which both Title VII and ADEA claims are raised and must be 
analyzed differently.81 
Turning to the question on which certiorari was granted, Justice 
Stevens stated that he would extend the holding of Desert Palace, a Title 
VII case, to hold that direct evidence is not required for a mixed-motives 
jury instruction.82  Justice Stevens first explained that neither the four-
justice plurality in Price Waterhouse nor Justice White’s concurrence in 
that decision required direct evidence for a mixed-motives analysis.  Thus, 
he argued that courts that have treated Justice O’Connor’s concurrence as 
controlling have been wrong.83  Regardless, Justice Stevens found any 
questions raised by Price Waterhouse to have been answered by Desert 
Palace.  Although the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not amend the ADEA 
regarding the mixed-motives analysis, Justice Stevens’ dissent relied on 
Desert Palace for a proposition it stated about Title VII that is equally true 
about the ADEA:  neither statute by its terms imposes a direct evidence 
requirement.84 
 A dissent authored by Justice Breyer focused on why a standard of 
causation lower than but-for is appropriate for discrimination cases.  The 
Breyer dissent described the difficulty of discerning the motives for 
employers’ decisions.  Justice Breyer posited that but-for causation is not 
as difficult in tort law, which deals with objective facts, as it is in 
employment discrimination, where the but-for standard is applied to 
subjective mental states.85  Because the employer is in a better position than 
the employee to know its motives, Justice Breyer could discern nothing 
“unfair or impractical” in requiring a plaintiff to prove that age played a 
role and then the employer can try to prevail on the affirmative defense by 
proving that it would have made the same decision.86 
 
 80. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2356-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 81. Id. at 2357. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id.; see also Recent Cases, Employment Law “Discrimination” Ninth Circuit Finds 
for Employee in a Mixed-Motive Case Without “Direct Evidence” of Discrimination Costa 
v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 816 
(2003), 116 HARV. L. REV. 1897 (2003) (arguing that Justice O’Connor’s statements about 
direct evidence should be viewed as dictum because her vote did not substantially affect the 
outcome of the case); see also Harper, supra note 46, at 91 (arguing that lower courts should 
have ignored the concurring opinion by Justice O’Connor). 
 84. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2358. 
 85. Id. at 2358-59 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 86. Id. at 2359. 
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C. Desert Palace and Gross:  The Master Builder Reinterprets the 
Blueprint and Confounds the Builders 
 In 2003 the Supreme Court changed employment discrimination law 
as we knew it.  In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, the Court held that direct 
evidence of discrimination is not a prerequisite for a court to give a 
motivating-factor jury instruction in Title VII cases.87  The holding itself 
changed the established case law about how to evaluate disparate treatment 
cases under Title VII.  The Court resolved the effect that the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 has on existing employment discrimination doctrine developed 
in Price Waterhouse and its progeny.  Beyond the holding, the decision 
implicated a number of other significant issues that it did not answer.  Did 
the pretext analysis developed for Title VII disparate treatment cases in 
McDonnell Douglas v. Green88 remain viable?  If the pretext analysis 
survives Desert Palace, what determines whether a case is evaluated under 
the pretext analysis or the mixed-motives analysis?  If the pretext analysis 
survives, at what stages of litigation does it apply?  The Court, in a 
footnote, essentially stated that it was not resolving these other questions.89  
The Court thus decided the narrowest issue presented in Desert Palace and, 
in the aftermath, left litigation of disparate treatment cases under Title VII 
in a state of disarray.90  In addition to the questions Desert Palace left 
unresolved about Title VII, courts and commentators were left to discern 
what, if any, effect Desert Palace had on the ADEA. 
Six years after the Supreme Court decided Desert Palace, it ventured 
back into the chaotic area of the proof structures used to analyze intentional 
discrimination cases.  When the Court granted certiorari in Gross v. FBL 
Financial Services, Inc.,91 it appeared to be Desert Palace Part II.  As the 
Court decided the case, however, it turned out to be much more.  Thus, the 
Court seemed poised to answer a narrow question:  Whether the Price 
Waterhouse direct evidence/circumstantial evidence line that divides cases 
 
 87. 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
 88. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 89. “This case does not require us to decide when, if ever, § 107 applies outside of the 
mixed-motive context.”  Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 94 n.1. 
 90. See Corbett, Fixing supra note 41 (arguing that employment discrimination law in 
the U.S. is “broken” and the state of disrepair is so bad that lawyers and judges do not know 
how to analyze any given case); Prenkert, supra note 16, at 512 (arguing that disparate 
treatment law is in disarray and calling for Congress to “end the fragmentation of disparate 
treatment law and clean up the mixed-motives mess”); Sandra F. Sperino, Recreating 
Diversity in Employment Law by Debunking the Myth of McDonnell Douglas, 44 HOUS. L. 
REV. 349, 373 (2007) (“Currently, the federal law is in a state of flux regarding the 
intersection of the 1991 amendments to Title VII, the Desert Palace decision, and the 
McDonnell Douglas test.”). 
 91. Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., Inc., 526 F.3d 356 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. 
Ct. 680 (2008). 
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between pretext and mixed-motives analyses still applies to ADEA claims, 
even though it no longer applies to Title VII claims.  Different treatment of 
the two employment discrimination laws was feasible because the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, which formed the basis for the Court’s analysis in 
Desert Palace, did not amend the ADEA as it did Title VII.  Gross thus 
appeared to be the sequel to Desert Palace, answering the same question 
for the ADEA that Desert Palace answered for Title VII.  Surprisingly, 
though, the Court rendered a decision that answered a much broader 
question.  The Court held that the mixed-motives analysis or proof 
structure does not even apply to ADEA cases; instead, the burden of 
persuasion is on the plaintiff to prove but-for causation, and the burden 
never shifts to the defendant.92 
 The comparisons and contrasts between Desert Palace and Gross 
are numerous and striking.  The same issue was before the Court, but under 
Title VII in Desert Palace and under the ADEA in Gross.  The Court in 
Desert Palace showed remarkable restraint in answering a narrow question 
and not answering additional questions that were implicated, the answers to 
which were needed to avoid rampant confusion in Title VII disparate 
treatment litigation.  In contrast, in Gross, the Court went out of its way to 
answer a broad question, which probably will produce a high degree of 
certainty in litigation of ADEA disparate treatment claims.  The Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 played an important role in each case, but it played a 
very different role in each.  In Desert Palace, the Court announced a major 
change in the law by interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as requiring 
the change.  By contrast, the Court in Gross announced what most courts 
and commentators perceive as a major change in the law by using the Civil 
Rights Act to free it of the potential precedential effect of Desert Palace 
and, even more surprisingly, Price Waterhouse.  Desert Palace could have 
moved the state of the law to a single proof structure applicable to Title VII 
disparate treatment claims, but the Court did not rule broadly enough to 
make that result clear, and few courts have interpreted Desert Palace that 
way.93  Because the Court ruled broadly in Gross, there now is a single 
causation standard for the ADEA, though the Court did not resolve the 
issue of what, if any, proof structures apply under the ADEA.  Generally, 
Desert Palace moved the law in a positive direction for 
employees/plaintiffs under Title VII, while Gross moved it in a positive 
 
 92. Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2352 (2009). 
 93. One circuit court so held.  See Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 
(5th Cir. 2004) (holding that a “modified McDonnell Douglas approach,” which merges 
pretext and mixed-motives into a single analysis, applies to disparate treatment claims).  For 
discussion of Rachid, see infra Part I.D. (discussing how the Fifth Circuit reached its 
holding in Rachid and why its holding differed from the Supreme Court’s in Gross).  
Although Rachid was an age discrimination case, it unified the pretext and mixed-motives 
proof structures for the ADEA and Title VII. 
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direction for employers/defendants under the ADEA.  Before Desert 
Palace, the pretext analysis created by McDonnell Douglas and the mixed-
motives analysis created by Price Waterhouse were the twin pillars of 
disparate treatment litigation.  Desert Palace made Price Waterhouse 
irrelevant to Title VII cases, but left uncertainty about McDonnell Douglas.  
Gross finished off Price Waterhouse, declaring it irrelevant to the ADEA 
and thus dead law, but it again left us uncertain about McDonnell 
Douglas.94 
 Considered together, Desert Palace and Gross redefine the proof 
structures or analyses applicable to disparate treatment claims under Title 
VII and the ADEA.  Because they address the proof structures applicable to 
the two oldest employment discrimination laws that generate the 
overwhelming number of charges and lawsuits, the two cases have 
significantly reshaped employment discrimination law, even if they have 
left some of the contours ill-defined.  What does the new blueprint look 
like?  After Desert Palace there may be a single, uniform analysis under 
Title VII, but that is uncertain.  After Gross there is a single, uniform 
analysis under the ADEA, but it may not use any proof structure applicable 
to Title VII.  Title VII and the ADEA may share a proof structure, if both 
still recognize the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis, but they may not.  
Regardless of how that matter is resolved, we know after Desert Palace 
and Gross that the mixed-motives analysis is not uniform across Title VII 
and the ADEA because the ADEA recognizes no mixed-motives proof 
structure.  Moreover, under the rationale of Gross, perhaps the mixed-
motives proof structure does not apply to claims under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.95  Thus, predictions of potential uniformity in analysis of 
disparate treatment claims among the employment discrimination statutes,96 
 
 94. See cases cited supra note 27 (surveying the lower courts’ decisions regarding 
whether the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis should still be applied in ADEA cases 
after the Supreme Court’s holding in Gross). 
 95. See Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding, 
based on Gross, that the Americans with Disabilities Act does not authorize a mixed-
motives discrimination claim). 
 96. See, e.g., Katz, Unifying, supra note 29 (discussing the problems associated with the 
fragmentation of disparate treatment law and proposing the use of a single framework); 
Robert A. Kearney, The High Price of Price Waterhouse:  Dealing with Direct Evidence of 
Discrimination, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 303, 310-12 (2003) (noting the difficulty that 
arises when a plaintiff faces two different causation standards for one claim and proposing a 
simplified standard for evaluating the sufficiency of oral evidence); Benjamin C. Mizer, 
Note, Toward a Motivating Factor Test for Individual Disparate Treatment Claims, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 234 (2001) (recognizing that in many disparate treatment claims, plaintiffs’ 
already complicated claims become more difficult to establish due to the existence of both 
the pretext and mixed-motives analyses and proposing a set of jury instructions); Michael J. 
Zimmer, Chaos or Coherence: Individual Disparate Treatment Discrimination and the 
ADEA, 51 MERCER L. REV. 693, 693 (2000) (suggesting that “this chaos . . . may be a 
prelude to a new coherence”); Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure, supra note 32, at 
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for better or worse, have been frustrated. 
D.  The Interpretation the Master Builder Rejected:  Rachid v. Jack in the 
Box 
 About a year after the rendering of the Desert Palace decision and 
five years before Gross, the Fifth Circuit confronted blueprint 
interpretation issues in Rachid v. Jack in the Box.97  It is instructive to 
consider the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Rachid because it attempted to 
interpret what the Court said (and didn’t say) in Desert Palace, which is no 
easy feat in its own right, and to anticipate what the Court would say in 
Gross.  Rachid involved an age discrimination claim.  The district court 
had granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment.  Plaintiff argued 
that the trial court had erroneously evaluated his case under the McDonnell 
Douglas pretext analysis, and that it should have used the mixed-motives 
analysis of Price Waterhouse and Desert Palace instead.  The defendant 
argued that the trial court correctly declined to apply the mixed-motives 
analysis because the plaintiff did not introduce direct evidence.  The Fifth 
Circuit began its analysis with Desert Palace, saying that it had not yet 
addressed whether the decision changed the Price Waterhouse and 
McDonnell Douglas analyses.98  The Fifth Circuit rendered two significant 
holdings:  1) that whatever changes Desert Palace wrought in the two 
proof structures under Title VII, the same result should apply under the 
ADEA; and 2) that Desert Palace did alter the two proof structures, and the 
Fifth Circuit fashioned a new single analysis merging the two.  The 
Supreme Court later repudiated the first holding in Gross. 
 The Rachid court’s first holding was broad.  The court might have 
more narrowly held that a mixed-motives analysis applied to the ADEA, 
but that it was the Price Waterhouse version because the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991 did not codify a new mixed-motives analysis in the ADEA as it did 
in Title VII.99  Instead, the court reasoned that because the core “because of  
. . .” sections in Title VII and the ADEA were virtually identical, the 
statutes should be interpreted similarly.100  Just as Desert Palace pointed 
out that Title VII provided for no heightened standard of direct evidence to 
invoke mixed motives, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that the ADEA 
 
564 (discerning the possible emergence of a uniform proof structure based on the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 and two subsequent Supreme Court decisions). 
 97. 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 98. Id. at 310. 
 99. See Katz, Gross Disunity, supra note 16, at 865 (describing the approach adopted by 
the Fifth Circuit in Rachid as “total unification” of disparate treatment law and 
distinguishing it from “partial unification”). 
 100. Rachid, 376 F.3d at 310-11 
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specified no such requirement.101  Thus, the court held that direct evidence 
was not required for a mixed-motives analysis. 
 Next, the Court held that Desert Palace required a modification of 
the two proof structures, and the court achieved that by merging the two 
proof structures into what it termed “the modified McDonnell Douglas 
approach” in which the first two parts of the pretext analysis remain 
unchanged, and only the third part is modified.102  In part three, a plaintiff 
may prevail by proving either pretext or motivating factor.103  If the 
plaintiff proves motivating factor, then the same-decision defense is 
available to the defendant.104 
 It is instructive to compare and contrast Rachid and Gross.  The 
Fifth Circuit in Rachid was interpreting and attempting to build on Desert 
Palace.  Both the Supreme Court in Gross and the Fifth Circuit in Rachid 
said that they were interpreting the statutory text of the ADEA, and yet 
they reached opposite results.  Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit in Rachid 
found it necessary to distinguish its decision from its holding in Smith v. 
City of Jackson,105 and the Supreme Court in Gross also distinguished its 
decision from Smith, which overruled the Fifth Circuit’s decision.106  The 
Fifth Circuit obviously did not read the blueprint the way the Supreme 
Court did.  Who did a better job of interpreting the blueprint:  the Master 
Builder or the subordinate builder?  I think the Fifth Circuit came closer to 
building what Congress intended, based on the characteristics that the 
tower needs.107  Regardless, the Fifth Circuit at least came closer to 
building what Congress should draw in its next modification of the 
blueprint. 
E.  Who, If Anyone, Is Reading the Blueprint Correctly? 
 Does the Master Builder know what the employment discrimination 
blueprint, as amended in 1991, requires?  Desert Palace and Gross provoke 
at least a modicum of doubt. 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 312. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. 351 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
 106. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005).  For a discussion of Smith v. City of 
Jackson, see infra Part II.C. (discussing the Court’s holding that the disparate impact theory 
applicable to Title VII claims is also applicable to ADEA claims, but in a narrower version, 
thus making it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail). 
 107. This view seems supported by the Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination 
Act introduced in Congress.  For discussion of the Act, see infra Part III.D. (noting that the 
proposed legislation was an immediate response to the Court’s holding in Gross, and that 
the bill states Congress’s disapproval of the Supreme Court’s decision to interpret Title VII 
and ADEA cases differently, a decision that was inconsistent with established precedent). 
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 It is difficult to criticize what the Supreme Court actually said in 
Desert Palace.  It was, after all, a unanimous decision.  However, the Court 
has been appropriately criticized for what it did not say.  With respect to 
what the Court actually did say, was the Court correct in interpreting the 
1991 Act as abrogating the Price Waterhouse line between pretext and 
mixed-motives cases?  This was not an unreasonable interpretation, but it 
was also not a necessary one.  It seems just as likely, and perhaps more 
likely, that Congress merely specified only what it wanted to change about 
Price Waterhouse and other targeted Supreme Court cases.  That is, by 
saying nothing about the direct evidence/circumstantial evidence dividing 
line in the 1991 Act, Congress did not intend to effect any change.108  Even 
so, the direct/circumstantial dividing line was chimerical, yielding a variety 
of approaches for distinguishing direct evidence from circumstantial 
evidence,109 and it is likely that no one sheds a tear for the Court’s abolition 
of a bad standard.  However, the Court has been faulted for saying too 
little.110  Lower courts did not know after Desert Palace whether there were 
two proof structures for analyzing disparate treatment cases or one, and if 
there were two, how to distinguish which structure applied to which 
cases.111 
 At this point, enters a subordinate builder in Rachid to build on 
Desert Palace.  The Court first guessed that Desert Palace would also 
govern the ADEA.  One may fault the Fifth Circuit for this prediction and 
its reasoning.  After all, other courts had reached the contrary result 
because Desert Palace based its holding on the 1991 Act’s amendment of 
Title VII (the Act did not similarly amend the ADEA).112  However, the 
Fifth Circuit believed that a fundamental principle of the original blueprint, 
carried forward in the 1991 revision, was symmetry, and it used that 
principle to resolve the issue.  In Rachid, the Fifth Circuit looked at the odd 
structure of Desert Palace and chose to build upon it something that was 
simple, clear, and symmetrical.  It created a single proof structure 
 
 108. See Chambers, supra note 48, at 92-93 (noting that Congress most likely felt that 
the distinction between pretext and mixed-motives cases was a good one because it gave no 
indication that the 1991 Act was intended to change how pretext cases were handled). 
 109. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 851-53 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 539 U.S. 
90 (2003). 
 110. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 48 (evaluating and often criticizing Desert 
Palace). 
 111. For an opinion summarizing the positions of the various circuits, see White v. 
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008) (describing the holdings of various 
circuit courts with respect to the appropriate proof structures for disparate treatment claims 
after Desert Palace), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2380 (2009).  See also Charles A. Sullivan, 
The Phoenix from the Ash:  Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 
210 n.81 (2009) (collecting court decisions and articles). 
 112. See, e.g., Lawhead v. Ceridian Corp., 463 F. Supp.2d 856 (N.D. Ill. 2006) 
(surveying the interpretation of the law in different courts). 
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applicable to disparate treatment claims under both Title VII and the 
ADEA.  Moving on, the Fifth Circuit then tried to interpret what the 
Court’s Desert Palace decision meant about the two proof structures.  The 
court built a single merged proof structure consisting of pretext and mixed 
motives.  Although it is a curious-looking structure and one that I think is 
illogical,113 it was based on the preexisting structures and demonstrated 
symmetry and clarity, if not simplicity. 
 The Master Builder returned in Gross to tear down part of the 
Rachid construction, holding that the mixed-motives proof structure does 
not apply to the ADEA.  The decision merits criticism on several grounds.  
First, the Court obviously is correct that the 1991 Act did not amend the 
ADEA to create a codified version of mixed motives as it did Title VII.  
Thus, the Court concluded that mixed motives does not apply under the 
ADEA.  On the contrary, the dissent argued that what follows from the 
1991 Act is that the Price Waterhouse version of mixed motives still 
applies to the ADEA.114  The majority’s answer was that Price Waterhouse 
was a case involving a Title VII claim, and that the Supreme Court had 
never held the case’s mixed-motives analysis to be applicable to the 
ADEA, even though the courts of appeals had so held.  The Court then said 
it must go back to the language of the ADEA, and it interpreted the 
“because of . . . age” language as requiring but-for causation.  There are 
several problems with this reasoning.  First, the Court makes it a point that, 
after the 1991 Act, the burden of persuasion in Title VII and that in the 
ADEA are different.  While that is true, the burden of persuasion was 
“because of” for both at the time Price Waterhouse was decided, as the 
 
 113. I have argued that the Court should not have created a merged analysis.  It did well 
to interpret Desert Palace as creating a single disparate treatment analysis, but that analysis 
should have been the Title VII statutory mixed-motives analysis.  It should have read Desert 
Palace as abolishing the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis.  See Corbett, Fixing, supra 
note 41, at 104-06 (arguing that Congress should not create a proof structure that merges 
pretext and mixed motives, but instead should adopt a modified mixed-motives analysis for 
all disparate treatment claims); Corbett, Allegory, supra note 48, at 1575-77 (noting that, 
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Desert Palace, the McDonnell Douglas approach 
should be abandoned).  Of course plaintiffs could still present evidence that the employer’s 
reason was pretextual, but the structure by which the court would analyze the case would be 
mixed motives.  Professor Katz has argued that there should be a “nonmandatory 
McDonnell Douglas,” meaning that plaintiffs would have the option of using the pretext 
analysis to prove causation, but would not be required to use it.  Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming 
McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 143 (2007).  I contend that, although 
plaintiffs certainly can introduce relevant pretext evidence, the pretext proof structure 
should be abandoned as its causation standard is inconsistent with motivating factor, and 
retention of the proof structure will perpetuate confusion. 
 114. The argument rejected by the majority and embraced by the dissenters was what 
Professor Katz terms “partial unification.”  See Katz, Gross Disunity, supra note 16, at 865 
(defining the “partial unification” position as the view that “pre-1991 Title VII definition 
(Price Waterhouse) applies in non-Title VII statutes”). 
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Stevens dissent in Gross and the Rachid court pointed out.115  Second, the 
Court rejects Justice Stevens’ point in his dissent that the Court’s approach 
in Smith v. City of Jackson should lead the Court in Gross to revert to the 
Price Waterhouse analysis for ADEA claims.116  In Smith the Court 
concluded that because Congress did not amend the ADEA with a statutory 
version of disparate impact, the Wards Cove version would continue to 
apply to the ADEA.117  The majority attempts to counter this argument by 
saying essentially that Price Waterhouse cannot be applied to the ADEA 
because the 1991 Act did not amend the ADEA to provide for a burden-
shifting proof structure.118  That argument does not effectively rebut the 
Smith-based argument.  Finally, the majority rejected principles of 
symmetry and simplicity by adopting a different analytical framework for 
the ADEA, saying this is what is required by the Architect’s blueprint.  It 
was not required, and it was a poor choice, as the dissenting justices 
explained.119 
II. A BLUEPRINT REQUIRING A LESS PROMINENT ADEA 
 Divergence between Title VII law and ADEA law is not limited to 
the holding in Gross regarding proof structures.  For many years, the Court 
has said that there are differences between the phenomenon of employment 
discrimination based on race or sex and discrimination based on age, and 
the Court has suggested or held (depending on the case) that the law under 
Title VII and the law under the ADEA should differ in ways reflective of 
those differences.  Gross is the latest of those decisions.  This approach to 
interpreting the ADEA was introduced in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins120 
and further developed in General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline,121 
Smith v. City of Jackson,122 Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power 
Laboratory,123 and Kentucky Retirement System v. EEOC.124  The 
divergence should raise a concern beyond the increasing asymmetry in 
employment discrimination law.  The divergence invariably has produced 
 
 115. Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2354 (2009) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); Rachid v. Jack in the Box, 376 F.3d 305, 310-11 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 116. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2354 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 117. Id. at 2356 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 118. Id. at 2352 n.5. 
 119. See Katz, Gross Disunity, supra note 16, at 868 n.49 (noting that “[t]he relevant 
language in the two statutes is identical, and we have long recognized that our 
interpretations of Title VII apply `with equal force in the context of age discrimination . . . 
.’”) (quoting Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2355 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 120. 507 U.S. 604 (1993). 
 121. 540 U.S. 581 (2004). 
 122. 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
 123. 128 S. Ct. 2395 (2008). 
 124. 128 S. Ct. 2361 (2008). 
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less protection against age discrimination than is available for the 
characteristics covered by Title VII.125  Is that structure, with a relatively 
less protective age discrimination law, consistent with the Congressional 
blueprint?126  With a large and growing percentage of the workforce in the 
United States in the protected class under the ADEA, and in the higher 
ranges of that protected class, this is an important question to consider.  
Gross is the most significant case reducing ADEA protection by making it 
more difficult for plaintiffs to recover in the most common type of case—
individual disparate treatment.  It has provoked negative reactions from 
influential people and organizations and calls for Congressional action.127  
The negative reactions may expand if the rationale of Gross is extended to 
make the mixed-motives analysis inapplicable to claims under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, as one court recently held.128 
 
 125. Professor Michael Selmi posits that the courts are reluctant to provide broad 
protection under the ADEA because the statute covers such a broad class, and courts are 
skeptical about the prevalence of discrimination against people in the lower age range of 
that class.  See Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to 
Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 564-65 (2001) (making the aforementioned arguments). 
 126. The answer is “no,” according to the proposed Protecting Older Workers Against 
Discrimination Act.  See infra Part III.D (noting that the intention of Congress was to treat 
the two types of claims the same way). 
 127. Not surprisingly, the AARP did not like the decision.  See David G. Savage, 
Supreme Court makes age-bias suits harder to win, L.A. TIMES, June 19, 2009, at 1, 
available at 
http://bulletin.aarp.org/yourworld/law/articles/supreme_court_makes_agebias_suits_harde
r_to_win.html (discussing how the Supreme Court’s conservative decision will make it 
harder for older workers to bring successful age-discrimination claims because it eliminated 
the long-standing two-step approach and replaced it with the requirement that plaintiffs 
“bear the full burden of proving that age was the deciding factor in the dismissal or 
demotion”).  AARP attorney Thomas W. Osborne was critical of the decision, 
characterizing it as one of several Court decisions suggesting that age discrimination is 
different from other types and not as serious.  See Susan J. McGolrick, Justices 5-4 Adopt 
But-For Causation, Reject Burden Shifting for ADEA Claims, Daily LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 
116, at AA-1 (June 19, 2009) (noting that Osborne was “absolutely” surprised by “how far 
the court went” in the Gross decision).  Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Senator 
Patrick Leahy stated as follows:  “By disregarding congressional intent and the time-
honored understanding of the statute, a five member majority of the Court has today 
stripped our most senior American employees of important protections.”  Id. at AA-3.  
Senator Leahy further likened the Gross decision to the Court’s “wrong-headed” ruling in 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 550 U.S. 618 (2007), which Congress overturned 
in the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.  Id.  For other criticism, see Kevin P. 
McGowan, EEOC Provides Guidance on Waivers, Hears Testimony on Age Bias 
Developments, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 134, at A-14 (July 16, 2009) (noting that 
outside witnesses criticized the Supreme Court holding in Gross at a July 15 EEOC 
meeting); Editorial, Age Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2009, at A22 (calling for 
Congress to reverse Gross as it did Ledbetter).  For a discussion of the Protecting Older 
Workers Against Discrimination Act, see infra Part III.D. 
 128. See Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that “a plaintiff complaining of discriminatory discharge under the ADA must 
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A. Laying the Foundation for Divergent Law Under Title VII and the ADEA 
 One of the most obvious differences between age discrimination and 
discrimination based on the characteristics covered by Title VII is that 
Congress passed separate laws.129  The Court began exploring the 
implications of this fact in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins.130  The plaintiff 
was fired a short time before his pension vested, and he sued, alleging age 
discrimination.131  He won a jury verdict.  The Court introduced the 
possibility that the disparate impact theory of discrimination, which was 
developed under Title VII, may not apply to the ADEA.132  After 
explaining the two theories of discrimination, the Court stated that 
disparate treatment addresses “the essence of what Congress sought to 
prohibit in the ADEA.”133  The Court explained why age discrimination law 
might differ from Title VII law:  the phenomenon of age discrimination in 
the workplace usually involves negative stereotyping about older workers 
being less productive rather than animus- or hatred-based discrimination.134  
The main adverse employment action that Congress sought to address in 
the ADEA was that older workers were being fired based on “inaccurate 
and stigmatizing stereotypes.”135  The Court was concerned that the jury 
may have based its finding of age discrimination on a finding that the 
employer fired plaintiff because of his pension status, and it remanded for 
reconsideration of whether the termination was based on age. 
 Hazen Paper Co. did not ultimately pronounce that ADEA law 
differed from Title VII law, but it set the stage for such a finding.  In the 
aftermath of Hazen Paper Co., many lower courts seized upon the Court’s 
statement that disparate treatment is primarily what Congress sought to 
 
show that his or her employer would not have fired him but for his actual or perceived 
disability; proof of mixed motives will not suffice”). 
 129. For useful discussions of the history of the ADEA, see Molly Horan, The Supreme 
Court Retires Disparate Impact:  Kentucky Retirement Systems v. EEOC Validates the 
Disparate Treatment Theory Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 J. NAT’L 
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY, 115, 119-21 (2009) (providing an historical background of age 
discrimination legislation); D. Aaron Lacy, You Are Not Quite as Old as You Think:  
Making the Case for Reverse Age Discrimination Under the ADEA, 26 BERKELEY J. EMPL. 
& LAB. L. 363, 366-70 (2005) (reviewing the statutory history of the ADEA in relation to 
the Civil Rights movements of the 1960’s); Jessica  Sturgeon, Note, Smith v. City of 
Jackson:  Setting an Unreasonable Standard, 56 DUKE L.J. 1377, 1378-80 (2007) 
(discussing the “[o]rigins of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act”). 
 130. 507 U.S. 604 (1993). 
 131. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 606 (1993).  He also asserted a claim 
under ERISA.  Id. 
 132. Id. at 608.  This is an idea the Court later rejected in Smith v. City of Jackson.  See 
infra Part II.C. (holding that the disparate impact theory applies to ADEA claims). 
 133. Hazen Paper Co., at 610 
 134. Id. at 610-11 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983)). 
 135. Id. at 610. 
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address in the ADEA as the basis for holding that disparate impact is not 
applicable to the ADEA.136     
B.  Different Law on Reverse Discrimination 
 The Court encountered the issue of whether the ADEA covers 
reverse discrimination137 in General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. 
Cline.138  The case involved the elimination of health care benefits for 
future retirees except those who were 50 or older on a certain date.  The 
plaintiffs were employees between ages 40 and 50.  The majority, in a 6-3 
decision, held that Congress did not intend for the ADEA to cover reverse 
discrimination claims.  Recognizing that reverse discrimination claims are 
covered by Title VII, the majority began with the fact that age was covered 
in a separate and subsequently enacted law.  Reviewing legislative history 
of the ADEA, the Court concluded that all references, except one, indicate 
that the ADEA was intended to protect older workers from discrimination 
against them and in favor of younger workers.139  The majority then argued 
that age as used in the ADEA’s “because of  . . . age” prohibition is 
properly understood as meaning “old age.”  The Court explained that while 
“race” and “sex” as used in Title VII are best interpreted as referring to all 
races and both sexes, age as used in the ADEA is best interpreted narrowly, 
 
 136. See, e.g., Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The lack of 
case law on this issue in the courts of appeal stems in large part from the fact that several of 
our sister circuits do not recognize a disparate impact cause of action under ADEA after 
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins.”); see also Debra Burke, ADEA Disparate Impact 
Discrimination:  A Pyrrhic Victory?, 9 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 47, 54-56 (2008) (surveying 
the case law). 
 137. Reverse discrimination is used to denote a claim of a plaintiff who is a member of a 
group that historically has not been a primary target of discrimination.  See, e.g., Donald T. 
Kramer, What Constitutes Reverse or Majority Race or National Origin Discrimination 
Violative of Federal Constitution or Statutes—Private Employment Cases, 150 A.L.R. Fed. 
1 (1998) (discussing cases addressing this issue); Ryan M. Peck, Title VII Is Color Blind:  
The Law of Reverse Discrimination, 75 J. KAN. BAR ASS’N 20 (June 2006) (noting that Title 
VII protects against all types of discrimination, including reverse discrimination); Charles 
A. Sullivan, Circling Back to the Obvious:  The Convergence of Traditional and Reverse 
Discrimination in Title VII Proof, 46 WM & MARY L. REV. 1031, 1034 (2004) (arguing for 
similar treatment of reverse and traditional discrimination cases under new methods of 
proof, to avoid possible constitutional infirmities of different treatment); Timothy K. 
Giordano, Comment, Different Treatment for Non-Minority Plaintiffs Under Title VII:  A 
Call for Modification of the Background Circumstances Test to Ensure That Separate is 
Equal, 49 EMORY L.J. 993, 996 (2000) (noting that courts remain divided on the question of 
how the principles of Title VII should apply to nonminority plaintiffs, and arguing that there 
are good reasons “for adopting a different prima facie case in reverse discrimination 
claims”). 
 138. 540 U.S. 581 (2004). 
 139. Id. at 590. 
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referring only to older age.140  The Court also referred to the “social 
history” of age discrimination, which, considered in conjunction with the 
statutory reference, leads to an interpretation of the phrase meaning 
discrimination against older people.141 
A dissenting opinion authored by Justice Thomas argued, first, that the 
plain language of the ADEA did not explicitly consider discrimination 
against older people, but just “because of . . . age.”142  The dissent also 
relied for additional support on the EEOC’s interpretation of the ADEA.143  
The dissent also pointed out that Title VII has been conclusively interpreted 
as covering reverse discrimination although there was no indication in the 
legislative history that discrimination against whites was a problem sought 
to be addressed by the law.144  Comparing the majority’s interpretation of 
the ADEA with the established interpretation of Title VII, Justice Thomas 
said, that “[i]n light of the Court’s opinion today, it appears that this Court 
has been treading down the wrong path with respect to Title VII since at 
least 1976.”145 
 General Dynamics Land Systems interprets the ADEA as providing 
narrower protection than Title VII, and it renders the two laws 
asymmetrical.  The result was not obvious, as indicated by a well-reasoned 
dissent.146  However, the majority rejected the dissent’s argument that 
“age” should be interpreted as the Court has interpreted “race” and “sex” in 
Title VII.147  The majority said that in common usage, one must add a 
modifier to “race” or “sex” to narrow the meaning, but in common usage 
“age” without a modifier means simply old age.148  Conversely, the 
majority opinion looks to identical language in Title VII and the ADEA 
and distinguishes them, thus building asymmetrically.  Similarly, in the 
later Gross case, the dissent would argue that the majority looks at identical 
language in Title VII and the ADEA and yet develops divergent law.149 
 What may have troubled the majority about recognizing reverse 
discrimination under the ADEA is the fact that employers must allocate 
resources for both employment and retirement benefits on some basis, and 
 
 140. Id. at 597-98. 
 141. Id. at 596. 
 142. Id. at 603 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 143. Id. at 605-06. 
 144. Id. at 608-09. 
 145. Id. at 611 (citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976)). 
 146. For example, the British Employment Tribunal interprets the United Kingdom’s age 
discrimination law as prohibiting reverse discrimination.  See Wilkinson v. Springwell 
Eng’g Ltd., (2008) ET/2507420/07 (E.T.) (awarding a plaintiff damages in an age-
discrimination case in the UK). 
 147. General Dynamics Land Sys., 540 U.S. at 597-98. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See supra Part I.B. (discussing the Gross decision). 
CORBETTFINAL 6/10/2010  10:51:58 AM 
2010] BABBLING ABOUT EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 713 
 
years of service and/or age is often the basis selected for making allocation 
decisions, particularly when employers must bargain with unions.  This 
same concern is illustrated in all of the cases discussed below in this 
section.  To permit claims when employers make such distinctions based in 
part on age either would subject employers to substantial liability under the 
ADEA or would deprive them of what the Court appears to believe is a 
relevant and reasonable basis for making such decisions. 
C.  Symmetry and Asymmetry in Disparate Impact and a Pyrrhic 
Expansion of the ADEA 
  The Court decided in Smith v. City of Jackson150 that the disparate 
impact theory of discrimination is applicable to ADEA claims.  The police 
department in Jackson, Mississippi had given raises constituting a higher 
percentage to officers with five or fewer years of seniority.151  The 
department claimed that the reason for the disparity was to raise the salaries 
of junior officers so that they were competitive in the marketplace.152  
However, because most of the officers who had less than five years of 
experience were under 40, the plaintiff sued, alleging that the compensation 
plan had a disparate impact on officers in the protected class.153  Seizing 
upon dicta in Hazen Paper Co. that found disparate treatment as the 
principal discrimination targeted by the ADEA, many lower courts had 
previously held that the disparate impact theory was not available under the 
ADEA.154  The Supreme Court unanimously rejected that proposition, 
relying upon the principle that when Congress uses the same language in 
similar statues, the Court will presume that Congress intended them to have 
the same meaning.155 
 So, Smith appears to be an exception to both of my arguments about 
recent Supreme Court interpretations of the ADEA vis-à-vis Title VII:  that 
the Court is not building symmetrically and that it is interpreting the ADEA 
more narrowly.  To an extent that is true; however, the Court went on to 
describe a disparate impact structure that is different from that in Title VII, 
and one under which it is far more difficult for plaintiffs to recover.  In 
finding as much, the Court said that two statutory differences between the 
ADEA and Title VII require this narrower version of disparate impact.156  
 
 150. 544 U.S. 228 (2005).  For detailed analyses of Smith, see Burke, supra note 136; 
Sturgeon, supra note 129. 
 151. Smith, 544 U.S. at 230-31. 
 152. Id. at 230. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See sources cited supra note 136 (discussing the influence of the Hazen Paper Co. 
decision on many lower court holdings). 
 155. Smith, 544 U.S. at 233-34. 
 156. Id. at 240. 
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First, the Court explained that the ADEA’s “reasonable factors other than 
age” (RFOA) provision,157 which has no analogue in Title VII, narrows 
ADEA coverage.158  Second, the Court pointed out that the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991 modified the disparate impact proof structure articulated in Wards 
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio159 by inserting a codified version in Title VII, 
but the Act did not similarly amend the ADEA.160  Thus, the Court 
concluded that the version of disparate impact applicable to the ADEA is 
the old Wards Cove version.161  The meaning of this statement was unclear, 
and this ambiguity caused the Court to clarify its meaning in Meacham.162  
Smith then applied the new ADEA disparate impact analysis to the specific 
facts and held that the plaintiffs had not alleged any specific employment 
practice which could cause a disparate impact.163  It is not at all clear what 
is exactly required to constitute a specific employment practice and why 
the Court thought that the plaintiffs had failed to identify one.164  However, 
the Court provided an alternative reason why plaintiffs lost, explaining that 
the reason for the difference in raises, bringing salaries in line with 
competition to retain police officers, satisfied the “reasonable factors other 
than age” (RFOA) provision.165  Thus, although the Court recognized 
disparate impact under the ADEA, it created an analysis that would make it 
very difficult for plaintiffs to recover, and as applied in Smith it resulted in 
a loss for plaintiffs.166 
 
 157. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). 
 158. Smith, 544 U.S. at 233, 240. 
 159. 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (most of the principles established in Wards Cove were 
abrogated by the Civil Rights Act of 1991). 
 160. Smith, 544 U.S. at 240. 
 161. This is the petard upon which the dissent would hoist the majority in Gross.  See 
supra text accompanying notes 78-79 (discussing how Justice Stevens in his Gross dissent 
relied upon the rationale of Smith v. City of Jackson). 
 162. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2404 (2008) (“To begin 
with, when the Court of Appeals further inferred from the City of Jackson reference to 
Wards Cove that the Wards Cove burden of persuasion (on the employee, for the business 
necessity enquiry) also applied to the RFOA defense . . . .”). 
 163. Smith, 544 U.S. at 241. 
 164. Sturgeon, supra note 129, at 1397.  This requirement may seem unexceptional 
because the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII, installing a statutory version of 
disparate impact that retained the Wards Cove requirement that the plaintiff identify (in 
most cases) a “particular employment practice.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i).  
However, the Court in Smith and Meacham seems to create a more limited definition of 
“specific employment practice,” thus saddling age discrimination plaintiffs with a more 
onerous burden.  Courts have understood this as plaintiffs asserting disparate impact in age 
discrimination cases after Smith have lost on either the particular employment practice or 
RFOA.  See R. Henry Pfutzenreuter IV, The Curious Case of Disparate Impact Under the 
ADEA:  Reversing the Theory’s Development into Obsolescence, 94 MINN. L. REV. 467, 492 
(2009) (exploring the appropriate standards for a RFOA defense). 
 165. Smith, 544 U.S. at 241-42. 
 166. See Sturgeon, supra note 129, at 1397-1401 (exploring the impact of Smith v. City 
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 Smith is an oxymoronic opinion:  it expands the ADEA but only 
superficially, and it creates a fictitious symmetry between the ADEA and 
Title VII.167  The Court grounded its holding on the principle that when the 
same language is used in Title VII and the ADEA, it should be interpreted 
as having the same meaning.168  The Court then goes on to recognize 
differences in language between the ADEA and Title VII, and it bases the 
modified version of disparate impact on those particular differences.169  As 
in Gross, the fact that Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended 
Title VII and did not similarly amend the ADEA was crucial to a different 
interpretation of the ADEA.  In the final analysis, although one may 
criticize some aspects of Smith, such as the cryptic discussion of a 
requirement that plaintiffs prove a specific employment practice, the 
decision seems well reasoned.  It attempts to preserve symmetry between 
the two employment discrimination statutes to the extent the statutory 
language permits.  In contrast, Gross eschews symmetry more than the 
differences in statutory language require. 
D.  More Symmetry and Asymmetry in Disparate Impact and More 
Restrictive Expansion of the ADEA 
 In Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, the Court decided 
that the RFOA provision in the ADEA is an affirmative defense on which 
the defendant bears the burden of persuasion.170  The Court’s consideration 
of the issue can be traced to the confusing reference in Smith v. City of 
Jackson to the ADEA disparate impact theory being the Wards Cove 
version.  The Second Circuit understandably construed the Wards Cove 
reference to mean the burden-of-persuasion scheme of Wards Cove 
applied, in which the Court had placed the burden of persuasion on 
business necessity and job relatedness on the plaintiff.171  The Supreme 
Court explained that the Second Circuit had misinterpreted its reference to 
Wards Cove.172  Looking to the section in the ADEA that contains RFOA, 
the Court pointed out that its neighbor in that section is a bona fide 
 
of Jackson on heightening pleading standards for employees). 
 167. See Joseph A. Seiner, Understanding the Unrest of France’s Younger Workers:  
The Price of American Ambivalence, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1053, 1094-98 (discussing Smith as a 
case that “erode[s]” age discrimination protection). 
 168. Smith, 544 U.S. at 233-34. 
 169. Id. at 240. 
 170. 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2400 (2008). 
 171. Meacham, 461 F.3d 134, 140-41 & 144 (2d Cir. 2006), rev’d, 128 S. Ct. 2395 
(2008). 
 172. The explanation clarified nothing.  The Court said the reference was in the context 
of a narrower disparate impact theory under the ADEA and to the requirement that a 
plaintiff identify a specific employment practice.  Id. at 2405. 
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occupational qualification, which is an affirmative defense to disparate 
treatment claims.173  After declaring RFOA to be an affirmative defense, 
which would seem to be a favorable result for those seeking ADEA 
protection, the Court seemed to apologize for the interpretation: 
That said, there is no denying that putting employers to the work 
of persuading fact-finders that their choices are reasonable makes 
it harder and costlier to defend than if employers merely bore the 
burden of production; nor do we doubt that this will sometimes 
affect the way employers do business with their employees.  But 
at the end of the day, amici's concerns have to be directed at 
Congress, which set the balance where it is, by both creating the 
RFOA exemption and writing it in the orthodox format of an 
affirmative defense.  We have to read it the way Congress wrote 
it.174 
The Court also tried to assuage concerns over these potentially harsh 
results by explaining that “[i]dentifying a specific practice is not a trivial 
burden [on plaintiffs].”175   
     Meacham is much like Smith in its oxymoronic approach to the 
ADEA.  It relieves a plaintiff of the burden of disproving RFOA.  As the 
Court notes, however, this was not new law, as it previously had referred to 
RFOA as an affirmative defense.176  The Court’s reaffirmation of that 
proposition in Meacham became necessary only because of its ambiguous 
reference in Smith to Wards Cove.  The salient feature of this case, 
however, is the Court’s effort to assure amici that plaintiffs will have a very 
hard time winning disparate impact claims under the ADEA.  The Court 
suggested that not only would plaintiffs have difficulty identifying a 
specific employment practice, but that employers should easily prevail on 
the RFOA defense unless the nonage factor is “obscure for some reason.”177  
In such a case, the employer would have a harder time satisfying the 
burden of persuasion on the affirmative defense.178 
E.  Narrowing the ADEA and More Asymmetry—The Troublesome Issue of 
Pension Benefits 
 The Court considered whether a retirement plan that made 
distinctions based on age violated the ADEA in Kentucky Retirement 
 
 173. Id. at 2400 (discussing 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1)). 
 174. Id. at 2406. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 2400 (citing cases). 
 177. Id. at 2406. 
 178. Id. 
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Systems, Inc. v. EEOC.179  The state’s retirement system provided two 
routes by which one could reach normal retirement and receive full 
retirement benefits:  1) 20 years of service regardless of the employee’s 
age; or 2) 5 years of service for those aged 55 or older.  The plan had a 
special provision for state employees in jobs classified as hazardous.  If 
such an employee became disabled and had not reached the age or years of 
service necessary for normal retirement, the system added the minimum 
number of imputed years necessary to bring the employee to normal 
retirement.  The number of imputed years that could be added was capped 
by the number of years the employee had worked.  The plaintiff in the case 
became eligible for normal retirement at age 55, continued to work, and 
became disabled and retired at age 61.  Because the plaintiff had attained 
normal retirement at age 55, no imputed years were added for him.  The 
plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC.  The EEOC sued, arguing that the 
plan facially discriminated on the basis of age because it failed to impute 
years to the plaintiff because he had attained age 55.  The district court held 
that the plan did not violate the ADEA and granted summary judgment.  
The Sixth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.  It 
seemed obvious that the plan did, on its face, discriminate based on age.  
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court reached a contrary result, in a 5-4 
decision, with the underlying rationale for the result seeming clear from the 
beginning of the opinion.  The Court stated that it granted certiorari “[i]n 
light of the potentially serious impact of the Circuit’s decision upon 
pension benefits provided under plans in effect in many States . . . .”180  The 
majority held that the plan did not violate the ADEA, relying primarily on 
Hazen Paper Co.  The majority quoted that case for the proposition that for 
a disparate treatment claim under the ADEA a plaintiff must prove that age 
“actually motivated” the decision.181  The Court specified six circumstances 
that persuaded it that the differential treatment was not actually motivated 
by age:  1) age and pension status are analytically distinct concepts; 2) this 
was not an individual employment decision, but a set of complex rules, and 
the ADEA in several provisions expressly treats pension benefits “more 
flexibly and leniently”;182 3) there was a nonage rationale for the different 
treatment; 4) although the plan worked to the disadvantage of the older 
worker in this case, it could work to the advantage of older workers over 
younger workers in some fact situations; 5) the retirement system was not 
based on the kind of stereotypical assumptions against which the ADEA 
was aimed; and 6) it is hard to think of another way to achieve the plan’s 
 
 179. 128 S. Ct. 2361 (2008).  For a more detailed discussion of the case, see Horan, 
supra note 129. 
 180. Kentucky Retirement Sys., 128 S. Ct. at 2366. 
 181. Id. (quoting Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 610). 
 182. Id. 
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objective without cutting benefits to disabled workers, which the state said 
it would do if it lost the case.183 
 The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy, agreed that 
the imputation provision of the plan sought to achieve a laudable purpose, 
but found that the majority’s opinion bent the law in order to uphold it.184  
The dissent argued that the law required a finding of facial age 
discrimination, leaving any changes to Congress.  The dissent faulted the 
majority for a misinterpretation of Hazen Paper Co., explaining that when 
there is facial discrimination, there is no requirement that plaintiff prove 
that age actually motivated the decision:  “[t]he rule [in Hazen Paper Co.] 
is that once the plaintiff establishes that a policy discriminates on its face, 
no additional proof of a less-than-benign motive for the challenged 
employment action is required.”185  The dissent cited Trans World Airlines, 
Inc. v. Thurston,186 an ADEA case, and Los Angeles Dept. of Water and 
Power v. Manhart,187 a Title VII case, as examples that facially 
discriminatory policies are illegal without proof of motive.188  In the six 
policy arguments set forth by the majority, the dissent found it “difficult to 
find a clear rule of law.”189  The dissent argued that by adopting a position 
rejected by all the appellate courts that had considered the issue the 
majority “creates unevenness in administration, unpredictability in 
litigation, and uncertainty as to employee rights once thought well 
settled.”190 
 The Court in Kentucky Retirement System again encountered the 
difficult issue of pension plans and the ADEA.  It is not surprising that the 
majority relied on another pension case, Hazen Paper Co., to try to explain 
why the facially discriminatory provision of the plan did not violate the 
ADEA.  Although one may concede that the challenged provision had a 
beneficent objective, it did clearly discriminate based on age.  The decision 
narrows coverage under the ADEA, permitting a facially discriminatory 
rule, apparently because of its laudable objective.  This is precisely what 
the Court has rejected under Title VII in cases such as Manhart191 and UAW 
v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,192 both of which were cited by the dissent. 
 
 183. Id. at 2367-69. 
 184. Id. at 2372 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 185. Id. at 2374-75. 
 186. 469 U.S. 111 (1985). 
 187. 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
 188. Kentucky Ret. Sys., 128 S. Ct. at 2375 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 189. Id. at 2373. 
 190. Id. at 2372. 
 191. 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
 192. 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
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III. REVISING THE BLUEPRINT 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, 
Inc.193 is a stark reminder of a message that should have been clear for quite 
a while:  the Architect must draw up a revised blueprint.  In 2009, I wrote 
that it was time for Congress to pass legislation to revise and clarify the 
proof structures used to analyze both disparate treatment and disparate 
impact cases.194  I proposed new legislation because the application of 
proof structures under disparate treatment and disparate impact has been 
uncertain for years.  Disparate treatment has been chaotic since the Court 
decided Desert Palace in 2003.  Disparate impact was not adequately clear 
before the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII, the 1991 Act did 
not adequately clarify it, and problems were accentuated by the recognition 
of a different disparate impact analysis under the ADEA in Smith v. City of 
Jackson.  With the Gross decision, Title VII and ADEA law have diverged 
in a practically significant way because disparate treatment is the theory 
under which most litigation occurs.195  Thus, the need for legislation has 
become even more urgent in the wake of Gross. 
 In my last proposal, I recommended that Congress should “legislate 
like it’s 1991,” meaning that Congress should consider issues and problems 
regarding the proof structures raised by particular Supreme Court decisions 
and fix them.196  However, the Court’s decision in Gross, following its 
decision in Desert Palace, leads me to recommend that Congress legislate 
somewhat differently than it did in 1991.  The 1991 revision left the 
blueprint unclear.  Gross is the third major decision (Desert Palace and 
Smith v. City of Jackson being the other two) in which the Court looked to 
what Congress did and did not do in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and 
interpreted it in a way that has made employment law more complex, less 
certain, and less symmetrical.  The Court may have interpreted what 
Congress intended in the 1991 Act correctly, but that is a dubious 
proposition.  Even if the Court was correct, the Court’s continued refusal to 
provide specific details that the subordinate builders need197 demonstrates 
 
 193. 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009). 
 194. See Corbett, Fixing, supra note 41 at 82 (arguing that discrimination law is broken, 
and it is up to Congress to fix in order to “restore an acceptable level of clarity, 
predictability, and functionality in employment discrimination litigation”). 
 195. See Laura D. Francis, Attorneys Say Ricci Will Impact Employers More Directly, 
While Gross Impacts Litigation, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 139, at C-1 (July 23, 2009) 
(offering evidence that Gross pertains primarily to the burden of proof in litigation). 
 196. Corbett, Fixing, supra note 41 at 99. 
 197. The most salient example is the Court’s refusal to explain in Desert Palace whether 
the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis is still viable, and if so, how to determine to which 
disparate treatment cases the pretext and mixed-motives analyses apply.  Not only did the 
Court not answer the question in Desert Palace, but it has not granted certiorari to address 
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that the Architect needs to provide substantial detail in the revised 
blueprint, leaving little to the interpretation of the Master Builder.  The 
Court’s grudging interpretation of the ADEA in Gross and other cases 
reinforces the need for Congress to leave little to interpretation. 
 
A.  A Uniform Statutory Proof Structure for Disparate Treatment 
 First, Congress needs to draw a single proof structure applicable to 
all disparate treatment cases.  In my previous proposal, I urged that 
Congress codify one proof structure for intentional discrimination claims 
under all employment discrimination laws and that it should be a variation 
on the statutory mixed-motives proof structure added to Title VII by the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991.198  I reassert my recommendation that Congress 
revise the second part, the same-decision defense, so that if a defendant 
satisfies it, it would not bar all monetary recovery by the plaintiff.199  Under 
my proposal, for Title VII and ADA claims, the employer’s establishing the 
same-decision defense should preclude either 1) compensatory and punitive 
damages, injunctive relief of reinstatement (reinstatement, promotion, etc.), 
and front pay, but not backpay; or 2) only punitive damages and injunctive 
relief, but not compensatory damages and backpay.  Turning to the ADEA, 
which has a different remedial scheme than Title VII and the ADA, the 
remedy-limiting effect of the same-decision defense necessarily would be 
different.  Because the ADEA provides for liquidated damages in cases of 
willful violations, the obvious solution is that the same-decision defense 
should preclude liquidated damages.  The important change is to make 
some monetary relief available to a plaintiff even if a defendant establishes 
the same-decision defense.  This modification of the same-decision part is 
important because the same-decision defense in the 1991 Act, although it 
ameliorated the Price Waterhouse effect of precluding liability, still left 
plaintiffs with virtually no monetary recovery, other than attorney’s fees 
and costs.200  Before Desert Palace, when the mixed-motives analysis was 
 
those issues in the six years since.  The most recent denial of certiorari in a case raising the 
issues was in 2009.  White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. 
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2380 (2009).  Similarly, the Court held in Gross that the standard of 
causation under the ADEA is “but for,” but it did not say whether the McDonnell Douglas 
pretext analysis should be used to evaluate disparate treatment age claims.  Gross v. FBL 
Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350-51 (2009). 
 198. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m) & 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2000). 
 199. See Corbett, Fixing, supra note 41, at 107-08 (explaining that “[a]s the next step in 
the evolution of proof structures, as Congress makes mixed motives the only proof structure 
applicable in disparate treatment cases, Congress should again alter the same-decision 
defense”). 
 200. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (making attorney’s fees and costs the only 
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thought to apply to only a small subset of disparate treatment cases (those 
involving direct evidence), the remedy-preclusion effect did not apply to 
many cases.  If one proof structure is made to apply to all disparate 
treatment cases, the significant remedy limitation of same decision must be 
reformed; plaintiffs should not be barred from recovering money after they 
prove motivating factor.  While I think that such an adjustment of the 
statutory same-decision defense would be an improvement over current 
law, Gross prompts me to urge Congress to carefully examine and debate 
the issue of cause in fact under the employment discrimination laws.201 
In light of Gross, Congress should consider the question of what level 
of causation it wants in the statutes, and it should consider repealing the 
“because of . . .” language, or at least expressly stating that “because of” 
means “motivating factor” or whatever other causation standard Congress 
selects.202  In Gross, the majority and dissent debated whether the statutory 
language requires but-for causation.203  As the dissent points out, this is a 
debate that also took place twenty years earlier in Price Waterhouse.204  
What neither the majority nor the dissent in Gross points out is that the full 
mixed-motives analysis is still a but-for test; mixed-motives analysis 
simply bifurcates causation into two parts (motivating factor and same 
decision) and shifts the burden of persuasion to the defendant on the second 
part to disprove but-for causation.  Justice Kennedy explained this in his 
dissenting opinion in Price Waterhouse.205  Now that the standard of 
 
possible monetary relief if the defendant proves the same-decision defense). 
 201. There are substantial arguments that cause-in-fact standards should not be used in 
evaluating employment discrimination.  See, e.g., Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation:  The 
Interpretation of Action and the Mixed-Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination 
Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17 (1991) (discussing the nuances of mixed-motives cases and 
criticizing the focus on causation).  While I do not disagree with that position, I do not think 
that Congress is likely to abandon the inveterate concept of causation in employment 
discrimination law. 
 202. Congress should not leave open the interpretation that one can plead and prove a 
discrimination claim under either the “because of” provision or the new causation provision.  
Regarding this problem under current law, see infra note 208. 
 203. Compare Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350-51 (2009) (age must be a 
but-for cause of employer’s action) with id. at 2354-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (an adverse 
action is any discrimination based in whole or in part on age). 
 204. Id. at 2354 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 205. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 283 (1989) (“One of the principal 
reasons the plurality decision may sow confusion is that it claims Title VII liability is 
unrelated to but-for causation, yet it adopts a but-for standard once it has placed the burden 
of proof as to causation upon the employer. This approach conflates the question whether 
causation must be shown with the question of how it is to be shown. Because the plurality's 
theory of Title VII causation is ultimately consistent with a but-for standard, it might be said 
that my disagreement with the plurality's comments on but-for cause is simply academic.”).  
See also Katz, Unifying, supra note 29, at 658 (“The 1991 Act framework imposes liability 
at the ‘motivating factor’ level, requiring ‘but for’ causation only for damages.”); Zimmer, 
The New Discrimination Law, supra note 48, at 1930-31. 
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causation debate has been reopened in Gross, Congress should consider the 
issue anew.  The dissent in Gross explained how difficult it is for a plaintiff 
to prove but-for causation on the question of whether the mental state of an 
employer’s agents caused them to take employment actions; the dissent 
contrasted this with what the dissent considered the relatively easier task of 
torts plaintiffs proving but-for causation in the context of physical, 
objective facts.206  The dissent also approved of the shifting burden at part 
two of the same-decision analysis because the defendant employer is likely 
to have better access to information regarding whether it would have taken 
the same employment action in the absence of discrimination.207  Now that 
twenty years after Price Waterhouse launched the debate, the Court in 
Gross has come full circle and reengaged in the debate over the appropriate 
standard of causation in employment discrimination cases, Congress should 
not just patch over the issue, as it did in 1991.208  Instead, it should debate 
the issue and decide the standard of causation and ultimately specify it in 
the statute so that the Court does not spend another twenty years trying to 
resolve it.  The appropriate standard of causation is significant because it is 
translated into the proof structures used.  For example, what standard of 
causation does the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis incorporate?  It 
usually is said to be but-for causation, but I contend that it actually is sole 
causation.209  The mixed-motives analysis initially employs a motivating 
 
 206. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2358 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
 207. Id. at 2359. 
 208. One may object to my characterization by pointing out that Congress selected a 
causation standard, “motivating factor,” from among those favored by the various opinions 
in Price Waterhouse, and codified it in Title VII.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006) (“an 
unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment 
practice”).  The problem, however, is that Congress simply added a new standard of 
causation without repealing the old “because of” language in the statute.  See 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (“shall be unlawful . . . to discriminate . . . because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”).  Although that approach could be 
interpreted in different ways, one interpretation is that there are two types of Title VII 
claims, and a plaintiff must plead under the appropriate provision.  See White v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008) (specifying under which section each of 
plaintiff’s claims was brought), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2380 (2009); see also Francis, supra 
note 195 (discussing attorney Eric Dreiband’s suggestion of a defense litigation strategy of 
pressing plaintiffs to choose under which section they are pursuing a claim).  Professor 
Harper argues that Congress in the 1991 Act did not intend for the motivating factor 
provision to be a separate cause of action for discrimination, as it was construed in White, 
and Congress needs to clarify this in new legislation.  See Harper, supra note 46, at 92-93 & 
134-36.  
 209. See Corbett, Allegory, supra note 48, at 1568 (arguing that it may be more accurate 
to see the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis as incorporating sole-factor causation); cf. 
Grubb v. Southwest Airlines, 296 F. App’x. 383, 389 (5th Cir. 2008) (characterizing the 
McDonnell Douglas test as the more restrictive sole motive test). But see Harper, supra note 
46, at 76-77 (arguing that the McDonnell Douglas analysis rejects both sole and sufficient 
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factor standard of causation and then but-for causation when it shifts the 
burden to the employer on the same-decision defense.  I doubt Congress 
will abandon some notion of but-for causation, having embraced it in the 
two-part mixed-motives analysis in the 1991 Act (essentially affirming the 
Court’s cause-in-fact debate in Price Waterhouse).  If the standard 
Congress chooses is but-for causation, the mixed-motives analysis 
incorporates that standard well.  Given the Court’s interpretation of 
“because of” as meaning “but for” in Gross and the potential for courts to 
interpret the statute as countenancing separate “because of” and 
“motivating factor” claims, Congress should repeal the “because of” 
language.  Alternatively, if Congress keeps “because of” out of respect for 
history, it should render it ornamental only by expressly providing that 
“because of” means the selected causation standard. 
 In light of the discussion of causation standards in Gross, it would 
be a propitious time for Congress to broaden the causation debate beyond 
causation standards that heretofore have been used in employment 
discrimination law.  The causation standards were borrowed from tort law.  
An innovation in tort law that would further ameliorate the difficulty and 
uncertainty of plaintiffs proving cause-in-fact regarding the employer’s 
mental state is permitting fact finders to discount recoveries based on the 
percentage chance that discrimination occurred.  This is a version of the 
lost-chance-of-survival analysis that has made modest gains since being 
introduced in medical malpractice wrongful death cases in tort law.210  The 
flipside of lost chance is increased risk, which has enjoyed some limited 
acceptance in some toxic torts and fear-of-contracting-disease cases.211  
One model for using lost chance/increased risk in analysis of employment 
discrimination cases would be to incorporate such an approach into the 
current statutory mixed-motives analysis:  after the two current steps, 
motivating factor and same decision, the fact finder could decide on a 
percentage basis to what extent the employer persuaded on its same-
decision defense, if at all, and reduce the recovery by that percentage.  I 
would apply the percentage reduction to all monetary relief⎯compensatory 
 
causation standards). 
 210. The seminal article on this issue is Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and 
Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future 
Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981).  The first reported judicial decision to adopt the 
approach was Herskovitz v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474 
(Wash. 1983) (en banc). 
 211. See, e.g., John Makdisi, Proportional Liability: A Comprehensive Rule to Apportion 
Tort Damages Based on Probability, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1063 (1989) (arguing for a 
proportional liability rule in torts cases); Tori A. Weigand, Loss of Chance in Medical 
Malpractice:  The Need for Caution, 87 MASS. L. REV. 3, 18 (2002) (urging caution in 
applying loss of chance in medical malpractice cases in Massachusetts). 
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and punitive damages and backpay.212  One of the chief arguments in favor 
of lost chance in medical malpractice cases is that it avoids the all-or-
nothing approach of other causation analyses.213  Moreover, a lost 
chance/increased risk approach would ameliorate the misfit between 
employment discrimination law and causation standards measuring the 
causative role of mental states.214  Essentially, a lost chance/increased risk 
model asks the fact finder to decide how likely it is that discrimination 
occurred, and it adjusts the damages awarded to that probability.215  
Although lost chance has been applied almost exclusively in medical 
malpractice cases, it has been applied in some employment discrimination 
cases.216 
 In the end, I think Congress will decide on a more well-established 
standard of causation, opting for the two-stage motivating factor and same-
 
 212. There are other ways that lost chance could be implemented to analyze employment 
discrimination cases.  See Paul M. Secunda, A Public Interest Model for Applying Lost 
Chance Theory to Probabilistic Injuries in Employment Discrimination Cases, 2005 WIS. L. 
REV. 747, 784-91 (2005) (advancing a “public interest approach for remedying probabilistic 
injuries in employment discrimination litigation”). 
 213. See King, supra note 210, at 1354 (discussing loss of a chance of achieving a 
favorable outcome or avoiding a negative outcome as a compensable loss in tort law). 
 214. See, e.g., Gudel, supra note 201 (discussing the role of causation in mixed-motives 
cases). 
 215. Professor Katz discusses tort law’s comparative fault allocation scheme as a way of 
ameliorating all-or-nothing windfalls to either plaintiffs or defendants, but he recognizes 
that there is no precedent for a comparative fault regime in employment discrimination law.  
Katz, Gross Disunity, supra note 16, at 887-88.  I think that comparative fault is not as well-
suited to employment discrimination law as lost chance/increased risk because often the 
nondiscriminatory reasons are not fault based, such as when an employer takes an adverse 
employment action due in part to economic reasons.  Still, a comparative fault regime that 
permits assignment of a percentage to the discriminatory reason could achieve the same 
result as lost chance/increased risk.  Regardless of what it is called, a system that permits 
assignment of a percentage chance that discrimination caused an action would improve upon 
the all-or-nothing problem of current standards.  Although one may argue that the current 
statutory mixed-motives analysis is not all or nothing because the same-decision defense 
does not avoid liability, it does preclude almost all monetary relief for the plaintiff. 
 216. See Secunda, supra note 212 (discussing the theory and its application in a few U.S. 
employment discrimination cases).  In the United Kingdom, a version of lost chance is used 
in cases in which an employer that fails to follow termination procedures claims that even if 
it had followed the procedures, it would have reached the same result.  This is known as the 
Polkey reduction after the case Polkey v. A E Dayton Servs. Ltd., [1988] A.C. 344 H.L.  The 
Employment Appeal Tribunal discussed the Polkey reduction in Mason v. The Governing 
Body of Ward End Primary School, Appeal No. UKEAT/0433/05/ZT (Apr. 12, 2006). 
It is common ground that if, applying Polkey, the Tribunal decided that there 
was a less than 50/50 chance of the employee being dismissed, the dismissal is 
unfair and an appropriate award would be made.  If there was a 33% chance of 
dismissal, a compensatory award would be reduced by 33%. 
Id.at ¶ 30.  The Polkey doctrine was legislatively abrogated by the Employment Act of 2002.  
Id.  It was restored by the 2007 Employment Bill. 
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decision defense with some remedy-reducing effect.  It is important, 
however, for the remedy-limiting effect of the same-decision defense to be 
reduced.  The current statutory version gives the defendant an exorbitant 
windfall for disproving but-for causation. 
 I reassert my argument that the same proof structure be made 
applicable to Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA.  This would abrogate the 
holding of Gross.  The Court majority explained that it must require but-for 
causation, with no shifting burden, based on the “because of . . . age” 
language of the ADEA.  The Court was clear that the mixed-motives 
analysis does not apply under the ADEA.  How about the McDonnell 
Douglas pretext analysis?  The Court did not say; in fact it said that it had 
never answered that question:  “[T]he Court has not definitively decided 
whether the evidentiary framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green . 
. . utilized in Title VII cases is appropriate in the ADEA context.”217  After 
Gross, it seems that none of the established proof structures should apply to 
the ADEA, although courts are clinging to the hoary McDonnell Douglas 
analysis.218  Unless Congress chooses to dispense with all proof structures, 
the same one should apply to disparate treatment claims under all the laws.  
The only reason to apply different proof frameworks is to make it relatively 
harder or easier for plaintiffs to recover under a given law.219  The Court in 
Gross interpreted the blueprint as making it harder for age discrimination 
plaintiffs to recover than plaintiffs asserting claims under Title VII.  I do 
not think that Congress intended to make it more difficult to recover under 
one employment discrimination law, and I do not think it will make such a 
choice in new legislation, particularly in the context of intentional 
discrimination.220  Indeed, the Court in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins 
suggested that age discrimination might not encompass disparate impact, 
but it said that “[d]isparate treatment . . . captures the essence of what 
Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA.”221  For intentional 
discrimination, a uniform proof structure should apply.  This is simple,222 
 
 217. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349 n.2. 
 218. See cases cited supra note 27 (cases continue to apply McDonnell Douglas pretext 
analysis). 
 219. See Katz, Gross Disunity, supra note 16 at 869 (pointing out that if Congress 
thought race and sex discrimination were more prevalent than age discrimination, it “might 
choose to make it easier to prove race or sex discrimination than age discrimination by 
adopting a less restrictive definition of “because of” in Title VII and a more restrictive 
definition in the ADEA”). 
 220. For a discussion of the Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, see 
infra Part III.D. 
 221. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993). 
 222. The Gross dissent criticized the majority for labeling the Price Waterhouse mixed-
motives analysis as complex and practically difficult, while creating a situation in which 
courts and juries in cases involving plaintiffs asserting both ADEA and Title VII claims will 
have to evaluate the claims under different frameworks.  Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2357 (Stevens, 
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symmetrical, and a good policy decision. 
B. A Uniform Statutory Proof Structure for Disparate Impact 
 In my earlier proposal, I recommended that Congress modify the 
statutory disparate impact analysis in Title VII and make that analysis 
applicable to the ADEA as well.223  Without rehashing too much detail, I 
recommended tweaking the prima facie case, eliminating job related from 
the business necessity/job-relatedness defense, and merging alternative 
employment practice into business necessity.224  Congress could provide 
that this same analysis applies to the ADEA.  If it does so, it should repeal 
the reasonable factors other than age (RFOA) defense in the ADEA 
because the Court in Smith v. City of Jackson and Meacham v. Knolls 
Atomic Power Laboratory indicated that RFOA is a harder defense to 
satisfy than business necessity.225  I argue for this uniform proof structure 
less forcefully than I do for uniformity regarding disparate treatment.  
When the Court explained the distinctions between age discrimination and 
race (and perhaps sex) discrimination in Hazen Paper Co., the Court 
suggested that these differences might manifest themselves in the 
nonapplicability of disparate impact to the ADEA.  I think there is a risk 
that several types of employment decisions, such as reductions in force and 
pension and retirement plans, routinely impact workers who are forty or 
older more than younger employees, and such decisions may subject 
employers to liability under disparate impact.  Still, the Supreme Court in 
Smith v. City of Jackson held that disparate impact applies to the ADEA.  I 
think that Congress will affirm that result.  To do otherwise would render 
the ADEA less protective than Title VII.  However, the current ADEA 
disparate impact analysis established in Smith and Meacham should not be 
maintained.  It is ambiguous (e.g., What constitutes an employment 
practice under Smith?226), and, as the Court suggested in Meacham,227it 
seems virtually impossible for a plaintiff to win.  This sham theory of 
discrimination should not be maintained.  Congress is likely to choose to 
maintain the current state of the law--that the disparate impact theory is 
applicable to the ADEA.  If it does, I think the same analysis should apply, 
 
J., dissenting). 
 223. See Corbett, Fixing, supra note 41, at 111-12 (describing how Congress might 
harmonize Title VII and ADEA differences). 
 224. Id. at 112-15. 
 225. Smith v, City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240-41 (2005); Meacham v. Knolls Atomic 
Power Co., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2406 (2008). 
 226. See supra note 149 (describing plaintiff’s unclear burden under ADEA). 
 227. See supra Part II.D (discussing how the Meacham court suggested that plaintiffs 
would have difficultly identifying a specific employment practice and that employers would 
usually easily prevail on the RFOA defense). 
CORBETTFINAL 6/10/2010  10:51:58 AM 
2010] BABBLING ABOUT EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 727 
 
in the interest of simplicity and symmetry. 
C. The Less Protective ADEA 
 The issue of fixing the proof structures is the most important issue 
for Congress to address.  The proof structures are applied in litigation on a 
daily basis⎯from evaluating the strength of a case, to conducting 
discovery, to ruling on dispositive motions.  By fixing the proof structures 
along the lines I have suggested, Congress would address the most 
significant issues and make employment discrimination law simpler, more 
certain, and more symmetrical.  It also would overturn several of the 
Supreme Court decisions that have narrowed the ADEA:  Smith, Meacham, 
and Gross.  Of the remaining cases, Hazen Paper Co. does not need to be 
addressed because it laid the foundation for different law under Title VII 
and the ADEA and suggested that disparate impact might not apply to the 
ADEA, a suggestion later rejected in Smith v. City of Jackson.  For the 
other two cases that narrowed the ADEA, it is not clear to me that Congress 
should legislate regarding General Dynamics Land Systems or Kentucky 
Retirement Systems. 
 Kentucky Retirement Systems dealt with pensions and retirement, 
two issues that have caused ongoing problems under the ADEA.  While I 
find the case troubling because it holds that a facially discriminatory policy 
does not violate the ADEA, the result in the case is probably good.  I doubt 
Congress would choose to abrogate the decision.  Congress could codify 
the result in the case or create a statutory exemption for rules in pension 
plans, but with the Court’s decision as controlling precedent for similar 
cases, it does not seem advisable for Congress to try to craft a general 
exception.  If the case were likely to insulate other facially discriminatory 
policies, Congress may need to act, but there seems to be adequate limiting 
language in the majority’s opinion.  Unless Kentucky Retirement Systems is 
relied on by lower courts to further constrict ADEA coverage, I do not 
think Congress should address it.228 
 Congress should consider the reverse age discrimination issue of 
General Dynamics Land Systems, but I do not have a strong position on 
whether Congress should overturn the result.  Reverse discrimination in the 
context of race is a controversial topic that elicits strong views.229  Imagine 
the firestorm that would be ignited if the Supreme Court held that whites 
could not sue for race discrimination or men could not sue for sex 
 
 228. But see Horan, supra note 129 at 161-62 (arguing that, despite the limiting language 
in the case, lower courts will struggle with how it applies to cases in which age is one of 
several factors used to determine benefits in policies or practices). 
 229. Consider, for example the news coverage and heated debates surrounding the 
firefighter testing case, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
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discrimination.  Yet, there has been no strong reaction to the Court’s 
decision that the ADEA does not cover discrimination against younger 
people within the ADEA’s protected class.230  Congress is unlikely to be 
lobbied much, if at all, to overturn the decision.  The strongest criticism of 
the Court’s decision has not been made on policy grounds, but on grounds 
of interpreting the plain meaning of statutory language and interpreting the 
ADEA consistently with Title VII.231  If Congress declared reverse age 
discrimination actionable, I think there is a possibility that it would 
generate a substantial number of claims and lawsuits.  As General 
Dynamics Land Systems indicates, employers, in allocating resources and 
addressing retirement issues, sometimes do offer benefits to older workers 
that they do not offer to younger workers.  Furthermore, with an older 
workforce and people staying in jobs longer, older workers may have more 
clout than in the past.  Although my first inclination is to argue for 
symmetry between Title VII and the ADEA, this is an issue for which there 
is currently little pressure for change.  Accordingly, I think Congress 
should not abrogate General Dynamics Land Systems at this time. 
 Although the Court’s narrowing of the ADEA from Hazen Paper 
Co. to Gross needs to be addressed by Congress, it is the more stringent 
ADEA proof structures created in Smith, Meacham, and Gross that are the 
heart of the problem. 
D.  The Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act 
 Congress’s immediate response to Gross was the Protecting Older 
Workers Against Discrimination Act.232  The Act chastises the Court in 
Gross for undermining Congress’s reliance on a long line of court cases 
interpreting Title VII and the ADEA consistently.233  The Act further states 
that the Supreme Court in Gross “eroded this long-held understanding of 
consistent interpretation and circumvented well-established precedents.”234  
The crux of the Act essentially makes the mixed-motives analysis of the 
1991 Act applicable to the ADEA by inserting the language that amended 
 
 230. See Seiner, supra note 167, at 1093-94 (contrasting the apathy of U.S. young people 
to erosions of employment protection for them with the violent reactions of French young 
people). 
 231. See General Dynamics Land Sys., 540 U.S. at 602 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the plain language mandates that the younger workers should have been able to sue for 
discrimination against them in favor of older workers); see also Lacy, supra note 129, at 
403 (arguing that Congress intended to allow discrimination claims under the ADEA by any 
person in the protected class). 
 232. S. 1756, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009); H.R. 3721, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009). 
 233. Id. at § 2(3). 
 234. Id. 
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Title VII235 into the ADEA.236  It further provides that direct evidence is not 
required to trigger the mixed-motives analysis237 and that the McDonnell 
Douglas evidentiary framework as well as “every method for proving  . . . 
such violation” is available to plaintiffs.238 
 While the Act would overturn Gross and accomplish some of the 
changes that I recommend, it does not go far enough in achieving 
symmetry,239 and it makes the bad decision of preserving the McDonnell 
Douglas pretext analysis by ensconcing it in statutory language.  In short, 
the Act takes yet another piecemeal approach to reforming employment 
discrimination law by overturning a Supreme Court decision with which 
Congress disagrees.  Congress’s failure to be the Architect with 
understanding and vision of the design for the Tower is indicated by the 
limited scope of the Act and its preservation of the pretext proof structure, 
which does not fit well with the mixed-motives framework. 
 It is incumbent on Congress to play the role of Architect by 
providing a plan for the courts rather than tearing down a part of the 
structure and leaving much of the asymmetry and incongruity in place. 
CONCLUSION 
 The great tower of employment discrimination law is a project in 
need of a new blueprint.  The Master Builder has been interpreting the 
Architect’s 1991 drawing in ways that have confounded the subordinate 
builders.  The result is that employment discrimination law has become 
more complex, less certain, and asymmetrical.  It is hard to believe that this 
is the tower envisioned by the Architect.  Unless Congress steps in to 
change and clarify the law, the builders are likely to continue babbling in 
different tongues as they try to build on structures such as Desert Palace, 
Gross, and Smith.  That is no way to continue work on an already 
impressive tower that the Architect envisioned would reach the heavens. 
 
 
 235. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m) & 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
 236. S. 1756; H.R. 3721 § 3. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. See Katz, Gross Disunity, supra note 16, at 889 (arguing that new legislation must 
make clear the applicability of the  same causation standard to the disparate treatment theory 
under all statutes); see also Harper, supra note 46, at 144 (“Congress should meet the 
challenge to federal employment law posed by the Court’s decision in Gross, not as it met 
the Court’s Price Waterhouse decision two decades earlier, by enacting a reactive provision 
for only the statute addressed in the decision.”). 
